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It has been widely argued that, with the decline in trade costs (e.g., transport and communication 
costs), the importance of distance has declined over time. If so, this would be a boon for countries 
located far from the main centers of economic activity. This paper  examines the evolution of 
countries’ distance of trade (DOT) in 1962-2000. We find that the DOT falls over time for the 
average country in the world, and that the number of countries with declining DOT is close to 
double those with increasing DOT. Thus, distance has become more important over time for a 
majority of countries. We examine various hypotheses in order to explain this phenomenon. One 
conclusion is that the evolution of the DOT is unrelated to that of the overall trade costs but 
depends on the relative evolution of its components. We also examine the impact on the DOT of 
changes in production, customs and domestic transport costs; air relative to land and ocean 
transport costs; competition, exchange rate policy, regional integration, uneven growth, and 
counter-season trade; and just-in-time inventory management. An interesting finding is that, though 
regional integration has a negative impact on the DOT, the countries forming trade blocs had a 
DOT that was growing faster or falling more slowly than that of excluded countries. The paper also 
offers some insights into how these changes may affect the home bias in consumption and the 
border effect. 
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ON THE GEOGRAPHY OF TRADE: DISTANCE IS ALIVE AND WELL 
 
"The report of my death has been exaggerated.” 




This paper examines the pattern and evolution of international trade from an 
economic geography perspective.
1 The integration of the world economy—commonly 
referred to as “globalization”—has increased rapidly in recent decades. This is manifested, 
for instance, by the fact that world trade has grown much faster than world GDP.
2 
3 A 
plausible explanation of the globalization phenomenon that has been set forth is the 
unilateral trade liberalization and participation in the multilateral trading system 
undertaken by an increasing number of countries in recent decades. Another one is the 
decline in trade costs, including transport and communication costs.
4  
A decline in trade costs also suggests that trade should have expanded 
geographically. In other words, one would expect that as trade costs fall, a larger share of a 
country’s trade would take place further away from its borders, resulting in an increase in 
the distance of its trade over time. The fall in trade costs and the declining importance of 
distance over time seems to be a widely accepted stylized fact, as illustrated by the title of 
Cairncross’s 1997 book “The Death of Distance […]”.  
But have trade costs actually declined? And even if they have, does that necessarily 
imply an increase in the distance of trade over time? As is shown below, the answer is: not 
necessarily.  
Two kinds of studies have questioned the conventional wisdom that transportation 
costs have declined in recent decades. First, using detailed data on shipping costs, 
Hummels (1999a, p. 2) provides evidence that ocean freight rates have increased. As for 
US air cargo rates, the evidence indicates very large cost reductions between 1955 and 
                                                 
1 The term “economic geography” is quite old. It was first coined by Keasley in 1901. 
2 World exports accounted for 8 percent of world GDP in 1950 and 20.4 percent in 1999 (Meilke 2000). 
Since 1950 world GDP has increased by 600 percent while world trade has increased nearly 2,000 percent.  
3 Another important manifestation of globalization, but which is not addressed in this paper, is the increase in 
international capital flows in recent decades.  
4 Studies have tried to isolate the impact of changes in tariffs, transports costs and others factors on trade 
growth in the pre-war area (Estevadeordal et al. 2003) and in the post-war area (Rose 1991; Baier and 
Bergstrand 2001).   2
1997 (Hummels 1999a, p.5), with air transport concentrated in relatively few places.
5 
Hummels also finds indirect evidence that US overland transport costs have fallen relative 
to ocean freight rates. The decline in US overland transport costs is confirmed by Glaeser 
and Kohlhase (2003).  
Second, a number of studies on the pattern of bilateral trade and the role of 
transport costs rely on gravity models. These models typically use distance as a proxy for 
transport costs to explain bilateral trade flows.
6 Though one would expect the (absolute 
value of the negative) elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to distance to fall with 
increased globalization, when the gravity model is estimated separately for different years, 
the elasticity actually increases over time.
7  
Reviewing the literature on trade and distance, Leamer and Levinsohn (1995, 
pp.1387-88) note that “[...] the effect of distance on trade patterns is not diminishing over 
time. Contrary to popular impression, the world is not getting dramatically smaller”. As 
pointed out by Brun et al. (2002) and Coe et al. (2002), other authors have failed to find a 
declining coefficient of distance over time and most have found a significant increase in 
the absolute value of the estimated coefficient. Disdier and Head (2003) perform a meta-
analysis of the distance coefficient estimated with gravity equations in 51 published and 
unpublished empirical studies. Their main conclusion is that the impact of distance on 
trade is increasing over time in a way that is statistically significant.
8  
                                                 
5For instance, over 30% of the value of US trade in 1998 was done by air, compared to 7% in 1965.    
6 Exceptions are Limao and Venables (2001) and Baier and Bergstrand (2001) who use the cif/fob ratio on a 
few OECD countries, and Hummels (1999b) who uses explicit data of freight rates for the US, New Zealand 
and five developing countries. Limao and Venables (2001) estimate the impact of being landlocked and of 
infrastructure on transport costs and on the volume of trade but do not deal with the evolution of the distance 
of trade. 
7 For instance, Frankel (1997, table 4.2) finds an elasticity of -0.48 in 1965 and of -0.77 in 1992. Similarly, 
Smarzynska (2001), in a gravity model that includes the relative distance to the center of world trade, finds 
for intra-OECD trade an elasticity that increases in absolute value from –0.68 in 1970 to -0.97 in 1990. In 
Leamer’s (1993) work, distance coefficients do not fall between 1970 and 1985. 
8 Exceptions are Brun et al. (2002) and Coe et al. (2002), who estimate a gravity model that is closer to its 
theoretical foundations, as defined in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). The coefficient of distance 
presents no clear trend when estimated with the standard log-linear specification of the gravity model in 
cross-section over several years by Coe et al. (2002) or in panel over 35 years by Brun et al. (2002). 
However, Coe et al. (2002) find that when the model is estimated non-linearly with an additive error term, 
the coefficient for the distance variable shows a decline between 1975 and 2000. Brun et al. (2002) introduce 
an augmented transport cost function (with indices of infrastructure, the price of oil, and the composition of 
trade as arguments) into the log-linear specification of the gravity model, and find a decline in the coefficient 
of distance of about 11% over the 35 year period for the whole sample, though the decline is largely confined   3
There are several problems with trying to infer the evolution of transport costs from 
the evolution of the distance coefficient in gravity models. First, the decision about 
changes in the level of trade at different distances does not depend on changes in the level 
of transport costs but on changes in the relative importance of the components of transport 
costs (see Section 4.1). Second, that decision depends also on other trade-related and non-
trade costs (see Section 4.2). Third, that decision depends not only on costs but also on 
benefits (see Section 5). Fourth, the decision to trade at a specific distance depends on its 
costs and benefits relative to the costs and benefits of the alternatives, namely, trading at 
other distances (including at distance zero, i.e., not trading at all). Fifth, and relatedly, the 
coefficient of distance measures the marginal impact of distance on bilateral trade. Thus, 
an increase in the absolute value of the coefficient of distance means that a marginal 
increase in the distance of trade (DOT) has become more costly or less beneficial. It need 
not indicate how average or total trade costs (or benefits) have changed. As is shown in 
Section 4, countries may trade at greater distances over time even though trade costs have 
increased.
9 
This paper examines the evolution of the geographic profile of countries’ trade over 
time. Specifically, it examines the evolution of the distance of countries’ trade.
10 This issue 
has not been systematically analyzed in the literature. We find that the distance of trade 
(DOT) declined over time for a majority of countries, with the US being a major 
exception
11. To paraphrase Twain: “The report on the death of distance has been 
exaggerated.”  
The fact that the DOT changes over time can be of major economic significance, 
with implications for countries’ welfare, growth and composition of trade. Other things 
                                                                                                                                                    
to bilateral trade among rich countries; for developing countries, the coefficient of distance does not decline 
over time. 
9 Evans and Harrigan (2003) also argue that the distance variable in gravity models does not reflect the main 
cost of transport which is more closely related to the time cost associated with timely delivery. This issue is 
examine in Section 5.4. 
10 In addition to the evolution of the average distance (averaged across trading partners), our data also enable 
us to examine the evolution of the entire distribution of trade according to distance (a sort of Lorenz curve 
with distance on the horizontal axis and cumulative trade share on the vertical axis). The evolution of the 
latter is not examined in this paper. 
11 In his concluding section (Section V), Hummels (1999a) states that the cost of distant relative to proximate 
transport has declined over time, and infers that this led to shifts in trade toward distant partners. One may 
conclude from this that the distance of trade (DOT) increased over time. His conclusion is certainly correct 
for the US (see Section 2), to which much of his data pertain.   4
equal (including total trade), technological or policy changes that make trade with distant 
countries relatively less attractive (more costly or less beneficial) over time compared with 
trade with proximate countries can be very costly for countries that are located far from the 
large economic centers and major producers of technology. Such an evolution may 
constrain their trading opportunities, choice of goods and access to technology.
12     
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) examine the home bias in consumption and other 
puzzles in international macroeconomics, which they attribute mainly to the cost of 
international trade. This paper examines how factors that affect the evolution of the DOT 
over time also affect the evolution of the home bias in consumption and the border effect.
13  
The analysis provided here deals with the goods market. This is a dimension of 
globalization that has been of great interest to economic historians (O’Rourke and 
Williamson 2000, p. 3). However, a number of arguments presented here are likely to be 
relevant for the trade in services as well.
14 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information 
on the average DOT in 1962-2000 for the world’s main regions and main representative 
countries, as well as some rank ordering of the DOT by industry. Section 3 provides 
evidence on the evolution of the DOT in 1962-2000 for different countries, regions and the 
world as a whole. This is presented in summary tables for exports, imports and total trade, 
as well as in a series of figures. Section 4 presents hypotheses related to the evolution of 
the DOT over time due to changes in the relative cost of trade at various distances. It also 
provides a model of choice between air and ocean transport. Section 5 presents hypotheses 
related to changes in the relative benefits of trading at various distances, and estimates the 
impact of several determinants of the evolution of the DOT examined in Sections 4 and 5. 




                                                 
12 See Keller (2002) for an analysis of the impact of distance on technology spillovers. 
13 For an analysis of the border effect, see for instance, McCallum (1995), Wei (1996), Helliwell (1996), 
Hillberry (2000) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003).  
14 Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003) examine the evolution of transport costs for goods, services and people in 
their analysis of the evolution of US cities and regions.   5
2. AVERAGE DISTANCE OF TRADE (DOT) ACROSS REGIONS, COUNTRIES AND PRODUCTS 
 
Countries benefit from proximity to the center of world activity and are penalized 
for being far from it. Since much of the world’s economic activity takes place in North 
America and Western Europe (averaging about 60% of world GDP in 1962-2000, though 
declining some over time), being located in these regions or close to them provides 
economic benefits (lower trade costs, better information, positive technological and 
institutional spillovers, and more). One indicator of a country’s proximity to the world 
center of economic activity is its DOT.  
The average DOT (ADOT) for 1962-2000 for various countries and regions is 
presented in Table 1.
15 What are the main results? First, the ADOT is about 50% larger for 
non-OECD countries than for OECD countries, putting the non-OECD countries at a 
significant disadvantage. Second, within the OECD, the EU-15 and Canada have the 
smallest ADOT (about 2,800 kms), followed by the US (about 6,800 kms), Japan (8,500 
kms), Australia (11,850 kms) and New Zealand (12,300 kms). Third, within the EU-15, the 
ADOT of the UK is some 40% larger than that of France (though with the fastest rate of 
decline for the UK over the period, as discussed in Section 3).  
Fourth, when ranked by continent/region, the ADOT is smallest for the EU-15 
(2,800 kms), larger for MENA
16 (4,590 kms), over double the EU-15 ADOT in the 
Americas (6,160 kms), followed by Sub-Saharan Africa or SSA (7,790 kms), Asia (8,085 
kms), and South America (8,180 kms). Fifth, no country’s ADOT is below 5,000 kms in 
either South America or SSA. And sixth, ranked by regional trade bloc, the EU has the 
smallest ADOT, followed by CARICOM (4,845 kms), the CACM (4,935 kms), UEMOA 
(5,335 kms), the Andean Pact (6,700 kms), the EAC (7,110 kms), ASEAN (7,435 kms), 
MERCOSUR (8,625 kms), and SACU (9,930 kms). 
The analysis of the evolution of the DOT over time in this paper is performed for 
aggregate trade in non-fuel goods. Obviously, the DOT varies by product category. For 
instance, Leamer and Storper (forthcoming, Table 1) show, at the two-digit SIC level, for 
intra-OECD trade plus trade between the OECD and developing countries (i.e., excluding 
                                                 
15 See Appendix 1 and Table A.1 for details about the sample used in this paper. 
16 MENA stands for the Middle East and North Africa.   6
South-South trade), the share of trade done with distant countries and with adjacent 
countries (as well as with island countries) for 1985, a year in the middle of our sample 
period. The value of (non-island) world trade with distant relative to adjacent countries is 
.64 for printing and publishing, .70 for wood, .73 for transport equipment, .96 for furniture, 
1.05 for paper and paper products, 2.93 for tobacco, 3.0 for wearing apparel, 3.07 for 
leather, 3.7 for miscellaneous manufacturing (e.g., toys and umbrellas) and 3.8 for 
footwear. This paper only deals with the DOT and its evolution for the category of non-
fuel products, though product-level analysis is on our research agenda. 
  
3. EVOLUTION OF DISTANCE OF TRADE (DOT) OVER TIME 
 
3.1. Notation and Definitions 
For each country, region, and for the world as a whole, we can calculate the 
distance of trade (DOT) and its evolution over time. This can also be calculated separately 
for exports, imports and trade (exports plus imports).   
Denote the value of the non-fuel trade flow between countries i and j at time t by 
Zijt, with Z = M, X, T, and  
Mijt = total non-fuel imports of country i from country j at time t (cif value); 
Xijt = total non-fuel exports of country i to country j at time t (fob value); 
Tijt = total non-fuel trade between country i and country j at time t (Mijt + Xijt).  
Denote the share of the non-fuel trade flows between country i and j in the total 
non-fuel trade of country i at time t by 
Z
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where 
Z
iwt s  represents the share of country i in world trade at time t. For the DOT of a 
specific region R, the summation in equation (2) is over the countries i =1,..., r of region R, 
and 
Z
irt s  is the share of country i’s trade in the total trade of region R. 
The evolution of these DOTs can be examined for individual countries, for regions, 
and for the world as a whole. These calculations have not been undertaken in the literature 
and are most informative, as is shown below. We compute the distance of exports, imports 
and total trade for 150 countries and 39 years (1962-2000) from the COMTRADE bilateral 
(non-fuel) trade data and the spherical distance between the main economic cities of any 
pair of countries (distance dij between country i and j).
17 The total number of observations 
on the DOT is 5,777 for imports, for exports and for total trade (see details in Appendix 1, 
Table A.1 and Table A.2 on the sample used). 
We graph the evolution of the distances of imports and exports (in logarithm) over 
1962-2000 and the corresponding estimated trend for different regions of the world and 
some main representative countries in Figures 1-10. The trend refers here to the estimated 
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We use the estimated trend, β ˆ , to compute what we refer to as the “change” 
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and we consider the “change” as being empirically significant if and only if     
Z
i d ∆ >5.5%. 
   
Z
i d ∆ is reported in Table 1 for the World, regions, and some countries and trade blocs.
18 
The trend β ˆ  is reported in Table 2 and shown in Figures 1-10.
19 
                                                 
17 See Appendix 1 for data sources. 
18 See also Figures 1-10 for the corresponding change in kilometers.   8
3.2. Evolution of the Distance of Trade (DOT), 1962-2000 
 
      3.2.1. World and Individual Countries 
According to Table 1 and Figure 1.a, the World, whose DOT over 1962-2000 
averages some 4,850 kms, presents no empirically significant change in the average 
distances of imports and exports in 1962-2000:     
X
w d ∆ is about -2.5% and    
M
w d ∆ is about 
2.9%
20. Though the changes over the entire period seem relatively small, Section 3.3 
shows variation in the trends across sub-periods, as suggested by Figure 1.a.  
Moreover, in addition to the trend of the DOT for the World as a whole, we also 
estimate the trend of the DOT for the average country in the world. This is done by 
running regression (3) for  ) ln(
Z
it d on the whole sample. This is reported in Table 1
21. We 
find significantly larger negative changes in the DOT for the average country (-12.0% or 
-662 kms for imports, and -5.3% or -256 kms for exports), compared to the changes for the 
World as a whole (+2.9% for imports and -2.5% for exports)
22. The difference between the 
results of the two regressions indicates that countries with negative trends are relatively 
small in terms of their share in world trade. 
These results are confirmed by the figures reported in Table 1. In fact, at the 
country level, Table 1 shows a predominance of negative trends in the DOT. The table 
presents some of the main countries in each region of the world. Out of these 28 countries, 
we find that: i) 17 countries have a significantly negative change in the distances of 
imports or exports (Argentina, Australia, Colombia, China, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, 
Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Spain, Taiwan, United Kingdom, Uruguay, 
Zimbabwe); ii) only 4 countries have a significant positive change in the distance of 
                                                                                                                                                    
19 See also Tables A.3 for the corresponding p-value and number of observations. 
20 Figure 1.a shows a difference between the World’s average distances of imports and exports. The first 
reason is that some countries are missing in our sample because of definitional changes during the period 
(e.g. the 15 ex-USSR countries). Second, the difference between cif and fob values in the weights of dij
M 
(distance weighted by the cif value of imports) and dij
X (distance weighted by the fob value of exports) 
combined with different cif/fob ratios at different distances may explain a part of this difference. For 
instance, with a cif/fob rate higher for trade with long distance partners, we should have di
M > di
X, which 
corresponds to what is observed in Figure 1.a, particularly in the 1990’s.  
21The results reported in Tables 1 and 2 are obtained with OLS. The results are not qualitatively different 
when we use the “Within” estimator by introducing country fixed effects in equation (3). 
22 These correspond to a trend (β) of about –0.14% for exports and –0.34% for imports for the average 
country, instead of –0.06% for exports and +0.08% for imports for the World as a whole (see Table 2).   9
imports or exports (Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, USA); iii) 5 countries present 
significant opposite changes in the distances of imports and exports (Cameroon, Canada, 
France, Ghana, Thailand); and iv) 2 countries have non-significant changes (Nigeria, 
Republic of Korea). 
In the entire sample of 150 countries, we find that i) 77 countries (51.3%) have a 
significant negative change in the distance of imports or exports; ii) 39 countries (26%) 
have a significant positive change in the distances of imports or exports; iii) 30 countries 
(20%) present opposite changes in the distance of imports and exports; and iv) 4 countries 
(2.7%) have non-significant changes.  
Thus, about twice more countries show an empirically significantly negative as 
opposed to a positive change in the distance of exports or imports over time (77 countries 
versus 39 countries, respectively, or a ratio of 1.98).
23  
 
   3.2.2. Regions and Sub-Regions 
The changes in the DOT for the world as a whole are essentially due to the 
OECD
24, as it represents, on average in 1962-2000, 73% of world imports and 80% of 
world exports in the sample (see Table A4). As in the case of the world as a whole, the 
OECD shows opposite changes in the distances of exports and imports between 1962 and 
2000, but contrary to the world’s case, these changes are empirically significant, with 
-7.0% for exports and +8.7% for imports (see Table 1 and Fig. 1c). 
The positive change in the distance of imports observed in the OECD and at the 
world level is in great part due to the US, which represents around 15 % of world imports 
in 1962-2000
25 and shows a 30% increase in the distance of its imports (or an increase of 
1878 kms) between 1962 and 2000 (see Table 1 and Fig. 6d). In fact, the World without 
the US shows a significant decrease in the distance of imports of about 7 % (see Table 1 
and Fig. 3a). 
                                                 
23 Recall that we consider a change from 1962 to 2000 to be empirically significant if it is larger than 5.5% in 
absolute value. See Table A.5. for the list of countries in each category. If we consider a change in DOT to be 
empirically significant if it is larger than 10% in absolute value, then the number of countries with negative 
changes remains much larger than the number with positive changes (70 negative to 41 positive or a ratio of 
1.72).   
24 OECD is defined here as the OECD according to the 2000 definition, i.e., with 23 countries (actually 22 in 
the sample because Belgium and Luxembourg are considered as one country in COMTRADE). 
25 See Table A.4.   10
As shown in Table 1, except for the US, with a strongly positive change of 8% for 
exports and 30% for imports, and Canada, which presents strongly opposite changes of 
-42% for exports and +36% for imports (see also Fig. 6b), most of the other OECD 
countries show strong negative trends: the EU
26 (for the 15 members as a whole) with 
-12% and -13% for exports and imports, respectively (see also Fig. 1d), Australia (-23% 
for exports and -20% for imports, Fig. 5a), Japan (-17% for exports and -25% for imports, 
Fig. 5b), and New Zealand (-40% for exports and -23% for imports).  
As shown in Table 1 and Fig. 1b, non-OECD countries trade significantly closer to 
home over time, with a decrease of 14% in the distance of imports (-943 kms), and a 
decrease of around -7% for exports (-524 kilometers). However, there is much variation 
within the non-OECD group, with negative evolutions in the DOT in the two largest 
developing regions, Latin America and Caribbean (LAC)
27 and Asia, and positive 
evolutions in the smaller regions of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). The changes in 1962-2000 are: LAC: -23% for exports and -10% for 
imports (see also Fig. 3.c); non-OECD Asia: -9.8% for exports and -26% for imports; SSA: 
+3% for exports and +12% for imports (see also Fig. 2.c); and MENA: +57% for exports 
and +21% for imports (see also Fig. 2.d). 
Table 1 also presents the change in the DOT in a number of sub-regions, including 
the Andean Pact, ASEAN, CACM, CARICOM, EAC, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, SACU and 
UEMOA in 1962-2000. We refer here to these sub-regions in their geographical capacity 
and do not examine the impact of trade bloc formation in this section. The analysis of the 
impact of the creation of trade blocs on the distance of trade is taken up in Section 5.1.  
Table 1 shows a significantly negative change in the distance of imports or exports. 
The change in 1962-2000 in sub-regions of South and Central America are strongly 
negative, especially for the distance of exports: MERCOSUR: -8.4% for exports and -2.5% 
for imports (see also Fig. 9.a); CACM: -24.2% for exports and -11.6% for imports (Fig. 
9.b); the Andean Pact: -18.3% for exports and -8.4% for imports (Fig. 9.c); The exception 
is CARICOM which shows no significant change (-1.3% for exports and +3.0% for 
imports, Fig. 9.d).  
                                                 
26 Europe (EU-15) represents around 45% of the world imports and exports in the sample, see Table A.4. 
27 Or, equivalently, the Americas without Canada and the US.   11
Similarly, the Eastern and Southern African trade blocs show a fall in the DOT 
(EAC: -37.6% for exports and -12.6% for imports, Fig. 8.c; and SACU: -13.9% for exports 
and -0.2% for imports, Fig. 8.a). For the ASEAN, the figures are -11.4% for imports and 
+0.6% for exports (Fig. 10.a). The main exceptions to the negative changes over time are 
NAFTA (-3.5% for exports but +38.4% for imports, see Fig. 6.a) and the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or UEMOA), with +13.9% for exports and 
+23.2% for imports (see Fig. 8.b). The changes in the DOT in NAFTA are of course 
dominated by the changes in the US.  
 
3.3. Evolution of the Distance of Trade (DOT) Over Sub-Periods 
What about changes in the DOT over sub-periods? According to Table 2, the 
World distances of imports and exports, which (as noted earlier) show no significant trend 
over the entire period 1962-2000, actually decrease in 1962-1979 and 1980-1989 and then 
strongly increase in the 1990s.
28 As shown by Figures 1.c and 1.d, these evolutions are 
strongly influenced by those of the OECD group, which are themselves largely based on 
the evolutions in EU-15 both for the large decrease in 1964 -1978 and for the large 
increase during the 1990s.
29 The evolutions in EU-15 (a strong decrease in 1962-1979, a 
smaller but significant decrease in 1980-1989, and an increase in the 1990s) are quite 
representative of the evolutions in the individual countries of the EU, as shown in Figures 
4a-4d.  
In contrast, the non-OECD countries as a whole (Fig. 1.b) present a long decline 
over the entire period for the distance of imports and, for the exports, a small increase over 
1962-1986 followed by a strong decrease. 
As noted above and emphasized in Figures 2a-2d, the evolutions differ across 
regions. First, Figure 2.a shows that, in the Americas, the distance of imports increased 
from 1968 to 1988 and then slightly decreased (with a trend, β ˆ equal to –0.46% in 1990-
2000 in Table 2), whereas the distance of exports started to strongly decline from 1980. 
These evolutions are essentially due to those in the NAFTA region, as shown by Fig. 6.a 
                                                 
28 Note however, in Fig. 1.a, the strong increase in the distances of both imports and exports in 1979-1984. 
29Actually, if we graph the evolutions of the DOT  of the World without the EU-15, there is a positive trend 
during the 1970s followed by a long and strong decrease from about 7007 kms in 1982 for imports (6652 
kms for exports) to 6087 (6180) kms in 2000.     12
(Figs. 2.a and 7.a are almost identical, which is to be expected as NAFTA represents about 
85% of the trade in the Americas, see Table A.4), and is particularly due to the US (see 
Fig. 6.d). Without the US or NAFTA, the distance of imports in the Americas (respectively 
Fig. 3.b and 3.c) presents a slight decline whereas that of exports decline significantly from 
the end of the 1980s. As noted earlier, these strong negative evolutions, generally higher 
for exports, and with a strong acceleration in the decline from the mid-1980s, are largely 
confirmed in Latin America and the Caribbean at the sub-regional level for MERCOSUR, 
the CACM and the Andean Pact (see Fig. 9). 
Second, Figure 2.b reveals a long decline in Asia (stronger after 1985) in the 
distances of exports and imports. This general decline is quite representative of the 
evolutions of the main countries of the Asia region, as shown by Figures 5.a-5.d (decline 
over the whole period in Australia and Japan and for imports in China and India) and 
Figures 10.a-10.d (decline in Hong-Kong, Philippines and in the ASEAN from the 
beginning of the 1980s). 
Third, Fig. 2.c indicates a strong instability in the distances of Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s imports and exports over time, with a positive and weak general trend for the 
entire region as well as for the sub-regions of West Africa over the whole period (but a 
significant negative trend in the distance of total trade in 1990-2000 equal to -0.16% for 
SSA and -0.43% for West Africa; see Table 2). Eastern and Southern Africa present no 
significant change in the distances of imports and exports over the whole period, due in 
fact to a positive trend until 1980 and then a negative one in 1980-2000 for both imports 
and exports. We find the same tendencies at a sub-regional level, as shown in Figures 8: a 
slight overall positive trend in the DOT in the UEMOA with a significant decline in 1990-
2000 (Fig. 8.b), and a negative trend, significant since 1980, in the average distance of 
exports for SACU and the EAC (Figs. 8.a and 8.c). 
Finally, for MENA (Fig. 2.d), most changes are positive, with a 20.5% change in 
the distance of imports (952 kms) and 57.3% in exports (1841 kms) in the whole period, 
except for some negative trends in 1980-1989 in the distance of imports and trade in 
general, due to the evolutions in the Middle East sub-region.   13
In the next two sections, we examine a series of hypotheses about the factors 
affecting the evolution of the DOT over time. Sections 4 deals with hypotheses related to 
costs and Section 5 deals with those related to benefits. 
 
4. TRADE COSTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE DISTANCE OF TRADE (DOT) AND ITS 
EVOLUTION  
 
The main general results of Section 3 are that  
i)  though there was little change in the DOT for the World in 1962-2000, 
the DOT for the average country fell over the period;  
ii)  the number of countries for which the DOT fell is close to double the 
number of countries for which the DOT increased over the period; and  
iii)  the DOT fell in the main developing regions of LAC and Asia and rose in 
the smaller region of MENA and somewhat in SSA.  
 
The fact that, despite the decline in transport and communication costs, the DOT 
fell for the average country and fell in many more countries than it rose over time, is 
puzzling. This section sets out a number of hypotheses about factors that are likely to 
affect a country’s or region’s DOT and its evolution.  
We are unable to formally test all the hypotheses presented due to a lack of 
internationally comparable time-series data.
30 Some of the main sources of time-series data 
are Hummels (1999a, 1999b, 2000) but these deal mostly with the US. The World Bank is 
starting a major data collection effort in the frame of the Trade and Transport Facilitation 
Program, but it will take some time until the data are collected and become available
31. 
Nevertheless, it is important to examine all the potential factors that may affect the DOT 
and its evolution, first, to obtain a better understanding of this important aspect of 
globalization; and second, because increased data availability over time (such as those 
                                                 
30 Section 5.2.1 estimates the impact of changes in dwell and distance costs, as well as other variables, on the 
evolution of the DOT in 1964-2000.   
31 The departments involved are the Transport and Urban Development Department and the Trade 
Department.   14
collected at the World Bank and elsewhere) may enable additional hypotheses to be 
examined in the future.  
The factors that have led to the change in the DOT can be classified into two 
groups, those related to the cost and those related to the benefit of trading at various 
distances. For those countries where the DOT declined over time, either the cost fell 
relatively more (or increased relatively less) for short than for long distances, or the benefit 
increased relatively more (or fell relatively less) for short than for long distances, or a 
combination of both.  
This section examines the cost determinants of the evolution of the DOT, of the 
home bias, and of the border effect over time as well as across countries. The benefits 
aspects are analyzed in Section 5.  
 
4.1. Transport costs 
The analysis focuses first on transport costs.
32 Divide transport costs (TC) into two 
parts, those unrelated to the distance traveled and which are referred to as “dwell” costs 
(L), and those related to the distance traveled, i.e., distance costs (DC). Dwell costs include 
port storage costs, the cost of loading and unloading ships (including the time cost), the 
time cost of queuing outside the port waiting to be serviced, and all other port costs. Total 
transport costs TC equal the sum of these two components, i.e.: 
.     DC L TC + =                                    (5) 
       Distance costs DC equal cost per mile (Cm) multiplied by distance in miles (m), i.e.,  
m C DC m       = ,                                            (6)  
where “cost per mile” includes fuel costs and all other costs of operating ships, including 
overhead and costs of manning and leasing ships.
 33  Combining (5) and (6), we have 
.       m C L TC m + =                                   (7) 
  Transport costs TC to a given location can fall either because of lower dwell costs 
L or because of lower costs per mile Cm. Though both a decrease in dwell costs and in 
distance costs have the same effect of increasing trade, they have opposite effects on the 
                                                 
32 As is shown in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below, other trade-related costs, including communication costs, as 
well as non-trade costs, also affect the DOT. 
33 As examined in Section 4.1.1, the per-mile cost Cm need not be constant.   15
DOT. Lower distance costs Cm raise the incentive to trade with more distant locations 
because their transport cost TC falls relatively more than for closer locations. This results 
in an increase in the DOT. On the other hand, lower dwell costs L  raise the incentive to 
trade with closer locations, thereby reducing the DOT. This is because a reduction in dwell 
costs  L  implies a larger proportional decrease in transport costs for small distances than 
for large ones.
34  
The log derivative of transport cost TC, for a trip of given distance m, is 














=                            (8) 
  Thus, the percentage change in transport costs is a weighted average of the 
percentage change in dwell cost L and in cost per mile Cm. It is clear from equation (8) that 
the elasticity of TC with respect to cost per mile Cm increases with m, and the elasticity of 
TC with respect to dwell cost L falls with m. The derivative of    ) (log    TC d  with respect to 
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implying:  
m TC d ∂ ∂ / ) log (  ⋛ 0 ⇔ ) (log m C d ⋛ ) (logL d .                           (10) 
Thus, if dwell costs L  fall proportionately more than distance costs Cm, i.e., if 
) (logL d < ) (log m C d < 0, then  m TC d ∂ ∂ / ) log (  > 0, i.e., the reduction in transport costs 
TC is smaller as distance m increases. Thus, despite the fact that transport costs fall, as 
long as L falls proportionately more than Cm, it becomes relatively more attractive to trade 
at closer distances and the DOT falls.  
What do the data tell? There is little information on the evolution of port costs, 
though some changes in technology point to a decline in these costs. For instance, 
containerization started in 1966 on North Atlantic routes, then spread to North America-
Asia and Europe-Asia routes by the early 1970s. Though the share of world tonnage 
shipped by container increased from 2% to 55% in 1970-1996, it increased faster and 
earlier in the US, from 40% in 1970 to 55% by 1979 (Hummels 1999a). He cites an 
                                                 
34 The analysis assumes competitive port charges that reflect actual costs. Section 4.2 allows for non-
competitive price-cost margins in production and distribution.    16
UNCTAD (1970) study that found large reductions in port labor costs and time in port, and 
increased ship speed and cargo holding capacity, though the increased speed and size of 
ships came at the expense of higher capital and fuel costs.   
Though containerization lowered both dwell and distance costs, it is likely that the 
cost reduction was larger for the dwell (port) component. Moreover, containerization 
reduced the cost of the inland movement of goods by facilitating their transfer between 
different shipping modes. In that case,  ) (logL d  <  ) (log m C d  < 0, implying 
m TC d ∂ ∂ / ) log (  > 0 (equation (10)) and a reduction in the DOT.  
The “border effect” in trade is defined as the difference between domestic and 
international trade where the two types of trade only differ by the fact that the latter needs 
to cross a border. The difference may be due to the cost of crossing the border (including 
port and customs costs) and differences in the laws, institutions, currencies, and more. By 
reducing port costs, containerization reduced the importance of the border effect. Finally, 
with the fall in both dwell and distance costs, total trade increased and the home bias in 
consumption declined.
35  
Though there are few if any time series on port costs outside the US, cross-country 
information is available. Based on the “Global Competitiveness Report” published by the 
World Economic Forum (2000), Wilson et al. (2003) have created an index of countries’ 
port efficiency, with Singapore being the best (1.000) and Bolivia the worst (.261). More 
recently, Egypt created a state-of-the-arts port at Ain Suhkna on the Red Sea which is 
privately managed and with integrated customs. Other things equal, countries with more 
efficient ports should have a smaller DOT, home bias in consumption and border effect.   
Port workers in a number of countries are unionized. This is likely to raise port 
costs, not just because of higher wages but because of restrictions on the number of hours 
worked. For instance, Chilean port workers had historically worked one shift a day, and the 
liberalization of the port labor market was equivalent to a tripling of port capacity and a 
reduction in port time for ships. This is likely to have reduced the DOT, the bias in home 
consumption and the border effect.   
                                                 
35 As noted above, containerization took place first in OECD countries, though the difference in the cross-
country degree of containerization is likely to have diminished after some time as more of the poorer 
countries improved their port infrastructure.   17
What about the evidence on the evolution of distance costs? Hummels (1999a) 
argues that for charter shipping bulk commodities (on a worldwide basis) as well as for 
general or liner cargo (for ships loading and unloading in Germany and the Netherlands), 
including containerized vessels, the cost per value shipped has risen since 1952 (see Figure 
A.1)
 36. Unfortunately, the figures for liner cargo include port costs. However, port costs 
are not included for charter or tramp shipping. Thus, at least in the latter case, the increase 
in distance costs should have a negative impact on the DOT. Note also that, though charter 
shipping cost per value shipped has risen, the cost per quantity shipped has fallen (and the 
latter has fallen for liner cargo relative to the cost per value shipped). This seems to 
indicate either that the value of goods per ton shipped over water declined or that their 
composition changed, with the more valuable products shipped by liner or by air. We 
return to this issue in Section 4.1.1.  
So far, we have focused on transport by ship
37. International trade between 
neighboring countries is typically made over land. The most important illustration is intra-
EU trade, though overland transport among neighboring countries is also important among 
members of NAFTA, among South American and Central American countries, in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and more.  
Hummels (1999a) uses indirect evidence suggesting that overland transport costs in 
the US declined relative to ocean transport costs. The decline in US overland transport 
costs is confirmed by Glaeser and Kohlhase (2003) who find that the cost of moving a ton 
a mile by rail has declined since 1890 by 2.5% a year, and that trucking costs have been 
falling by 2% a year since the Motor Carrier Act of 1980. They attribute the decline in 
overland transport costs to improved transport technologies and to the fact that the value of 
                                                 
36Note that Lundgren (1996), for a smaller sample, concludes that the constant dollar price of shipping bulk 
commodities fell substantially between 1950 and 1993, though—according to Hummels (1999a, p.2)—not 
the ad-valorem barrier of shipping bulk commodities. Second, freight costs may have fallen in recent years 
because of a change in market structure for liners, with the shipping cartels (Conferences) no longer in 
control, and because fixed shipping routes have been created which operate on a continuous basis and where 
distance is likely to be less important for countries on or close to these routes. The change in freight costs for 
countries located far from these routes is ambiguous.   
37 Hummels (1999a, p.5) states that case study evidence shows that ocean freight comprises only a third of 
total door-to-door shipping charges, and this fraction has changed little overtime. A 1967 OECD study about 
shipments between OECD trading partners showed that ocean freight comprised between 38% and 64% of 
total door-to-door shipping charges. Livingston (1986) found that ocean freight typically comprised one-third 
or less of total shipping costs from European to African partners.    18
goods lies increasingly in quality rather than quantity.
38 They also find a positive relation 
between products’ value per ton and the distance hauled, with a highly significant elasticity 
of .32.  
The fall in overland shipping costs has provided an incentive to increase overland 
trade, resulting in an increase in the DOT over land but in a reduction in the overall DOT 
(due to the increased share of overland trade). This would also apply to other regions than 
the US where this relative cost evolution took place.  
Fluctuations in the price of oil would also be expected to affect the DOT. Prices 
increased at the time of the oil embargo in 1973 and rose again in the early 1980s (see 
Figure 11). This led to higher shipping costs, as shown by spikes in the tramp shipping 
rates and liner price indexes in Hummels (1999a, Figs. 1 and 2).  The increase in distance 
costs  m C  relative to dwell (port) costs L  is predicted to have led to a reduction in the 
DOT. Real oil prices have declined since the early 1980s and this is predicted to have led 
to an increase in the DOT.  
Finally, we examine the effect of exchange rate policy on the DOT. Many dwell 
costs are typically in local currency (e.g., port labor costs) while distance costs are 
typically quoted in US dollars. Thus, one can rewrite equation (7) to include the exchange 
rate as follows:  
m C L TC m + = π /       ,                                 (7’) 
where π is the exchange rate (units of local currency per US dollar).  
  Assume that an exporting country suffers from inflation, with dwell costs rising 
together with local prices. If the exchange rate depreciates at the same rate as prices 
increase (whether by policy or through market forces), then  π /  L  remains unchanged. 
However, if the exchange rate depreciation lags behind the rate of inflation,
39 dwell 
costs π /  L  will rise relative to distance costs, the cost of distant trade will rise 
proportionately less than that of proximate trade, and the DOT will rise. On the other hand, 
a sudden devaluation will have the opposite effect. 
  
                                                 
38 Interestingly, they find that the cost of moving people within cities in the last three decades has increased 
for all size classes of cities, mainly due to increased congestion but also to increased real per capita income.  
39 The well-known phenomenon of “atraso cambiario,” as is commonly referred to in Latin America, where 
the exchange rate has often been used in an attempt to slow down inflation.   19
   4.1.1. Air versus Ocean Shipping 
Assume that exporters must choose between air and ocean shipping. Hummels 
(2000) estimates the value of shipping time to be very high (about .5% ad-valorem per day 
saved), with the increased speed of transport (air shipping and faster ocean vessels) 
between 1950 and 1998 being equivalent to a reduction in tariffs from 20 to 5.5%, and 
with saving time becoming less expensive because of the reduction in the price of air 
shipping relative to ocean shipping.  
We develop a simple model of choice between air and ocean shipping to examine 
the impact of changes in several variables of interest on the DOT. Assume an exporter who 
is shipping goods of value V and weight (or bulk) W to a location at distance m. The 
distance costs of ocean shipping  O DC  and air shipping  A DC  have two components, the 
opportunity cost of the money invested in the merchandise being shipped and the shipping 
fee. We have: 
W m b a S m rV DC W m b a S m rV DC A A A A O O O O ) ( ) / ( ; ) ( ) / ( + + = + + = ,                     (11)  
where r is the interest rate, V is the value of the goods shipped,  O S ( A S ) is the speed 
of travel by ocean (air),   m b a O O +  ( m b a A A + ) is the fee charged for ocean (air) travel per 
unit of weight (or bulk) W and is assumed to be linear in the distance m. The fee for air 
travel is higher than for ocean travel, i.e.,  A a  >  O a  > 0 and  > > O A b b 0. Thus, we have 
economies of scale with respect to distance m but not with respect to weight (or bulk) W.
40 
The trip lasts a time equal to  i S m/ ( i = O, A), and  ) / ( i S m rV can be thought of as the 
interest cost (or alternatively as the value of having goods arrive on time at a given 
destination; see Section 5.4).  
As long as  O DC  < ( > ) A DC , goods travel by ocean (air). We solve for the distance 
i m  where  O DC  =  A DC  and the exporter is indifferent as to the shipping mode. Shipping 
at any distance m < ( > )  i m  takes place by ocean (air). As  i m  falls (increases), the share 
of exports shipped by air increases (falls). The solution for  i m  is: 
                                                 
40 Including economies of scale with respect to W as well does not affect the results.   20
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Equation (12) implies: 
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Thus, the share of shipping by air increases with the speed of air travel, with 
interest rates, with the value of the goods shipped relative to their weight (and/or bulk), 
with ocean shipping costs, and decreases with the speed of ocean travel and the cost of air 
travel.  
Over time, the speed of air travel increased (so did the speed of ocean vessels 
though less), its cost decreased, the weight (and/or bulkiness) of many goods decreased, 
and the composition of production--and therefore exports--towards lower weight/higher 
valued goods increased. For instance, the share of light manufactures in the exports of 
developing countries to developed ones increased from 5% in 1955 to 58% in 1992 
(Hillman, forthcoming). These changes led to a rise in the share of air transport over time 
and in the DOT. As reported by Hummels (1999a), this is especially true for the US where 
these changes were more important and occurred earlier, and may explain the rise in the 
DOT over time for both US exports and imports.  
If rV in equation (12) is interpreted as the value of timely delivery of goods, then 
an increase in the value of timely delivery (say, because of the development of just-in-time 
inventory technology) raises the share of goods shipped by air. This is further examined in 
Section 5.4.  
The model was solved for the distance  i m  for which the cost is the same whether 
the product is shipped by air or by sea. The model could also have been solved for the bulk 
i W  or the value  i V  (or any other variable) for which both costs are the same.  
 
4.2. Additional Trade and Non-Trade Cost Determinants of Changes in DOT 
So far, we have examined the consequences for the DOT of changes in the dwell 
and distance components of international transport costs. Other trade-related costs as well 
as non-trade costs also affect the DOT. Most are examined here, with communication costs   21
examined in Section 4.3. We abstract here from exchange rate issues, which were 
examined in Section 4.1. We also abstract from international production fragmentation, 
which is examined in Section 5.4.  
The cost to consumers in country j of a product imported from country i,  ji P , is: 
j j j j j j ij i i i i i ji MU DT CC t L D L CC DT MU C P + + + + + + + + + + = τ ) ( ,                    (14) 
where  ji P  is the consumer price in country j of a good exported from country i,  i C  
is the production cost in country i,  i MU  is the markup (or price-cost margin) in the 
exported good’s industry in country i,  i DT  is the domestic transport cost from the plant to 
the port in i,  i CC  is the cost of customs in i,  i L  are dwell costs in i,  ij D  is the distance cost 
of shipping the good from country i to country j,  j L  are the dwell costs in country j,  j τ  is 
the ad-valorem tariff factor (1 + the ad-valorem tariff) in country j (which is assumed to be 
applied on the c.i.f. value),
41  j t  is the specific tariff in j,  j CC  are the customs costs in j, 
j DT  are the domestic transport costs from the port to the consumption center in j,  j MU  is 
the markup in j, and it is assumed that the ad-valorem tariff is applied on a price that 
includes dwell costs in j.
42   
Collecting in equation (14) the non-distance costs, NDC , on the one hand, and the 
distance costs, DC , on the other hand, we have: 
j ij j j j j j j i i i i i ji D MU DT CC t L L CC DT MU C P τ τ + + + + + + + + + + = ] ) [( ,               (15) 
 with   
j j j j j j i i i i i MU DT CC t L L CC DT MU C NDC + + + + + + + + + = τ ) ( ,                   (16) 
 and   
j ij D DC τ = .                  (17) 
A reduction in any of the cost components of NDC  provides an incentive to lower 
the DOT. The only possible exception is the ad-valorem tariff factor  j τ , and we return to 
this below. For instance, assume that production costs  i C  have declined. This lowers the 
                                                 
41 The US tariffs are applied on the fob value and their impact is examined below.   
42 Note that if exchange rates are taken into account, one would need to include two exchange rates, one 
applied to the dwell costs of the exporting country and the other to the dwell costs of the importing country.    22
non-distance costs NDC  and the consumer price in country j,  ji P . That reduction in  ji P  is 
proportionately larger, the smaller is the distance cost DC , i.e., the smaller the distance 
between countries i and j. Thus, any reduction in NDC (with the possible exception of  j τ ) 
lowers the DOT. Note also that trade increases with any reduction in NDC or in DC. This 
raises competition and should result in a reduction in the (non-competitive) markups, with 
a further decline in the DOT.  
The cost of some tradables, such as high-tech equipment, has fallen dramatically 
over time. This has the greatest proportional impact on price at the factory if workers can 
buy the equipment (say, personal computers) at cost. The proportional price reduction is 
somewhat smaller in the local store because of additional fixed costs, is smaller still in 
more distant locations where the price includes domestic transport costs, smaller still in 
neighboring countries, and smallest in the most distant countries. This implies an increase 
in the home bias in consumption and a smaller DOT.   
Similarly, greater domestic or international competition, whether in the exporting 
or importing country, reduces the markup and the DOT. The proportional reduction in cost 
is greatest for domestic consumption. This raises the home consumption bias. Similar 
results are obtained with a reduction in domestic transport costs, dwell costs, customs costs 
and in specific tariffs. 
What about the ad-valorem tariff factor  j τ ? We start with the assumption that the 
ad-valorem tariff ( j τ -1) is applied to the c.i.f. value of the product, as assumed in 
equations (14) - (17). A given reduction in  j τ  has a larger proportional effect on DC  than 
on  NDC . The effect is equi-proportional for DC  (see equation (17)), but it is less than 
equi-proportional for NDC  because some of its terms are not affected by a reduction in 
j τ , as shown in equation (16). This would provide an incentive to increase the DOT. On 
the other hand, a reduction in the ad-valorem tariff raises the degree of international market 
contestability and leads to a reduction in markups. This has the opposite effect of lowering 
the DOT. Which effect dominates is ambiguous a priori. 
The US applies its ad-valorem tariff on the fob value of the product. The fob value 
does not include transport costs  ij D  (or dwell costs  j L  in j). In that case, equation (17)   23
becomes  ij D DC = , and a reduction in the US ad-valorem tariff factor  US τ  lowers the NDC 
component but not the DC component. This should reduce the DOT for US imports. On 
the other hand, US tariffs have been low for a while, with a decline from 3.8 to 1.8% in 
1989-2001 (World Bank 2003), so that this effect on the US DOT is likely to have been 
small. 
  Trade facilitation has played an important role in the area of trade reform in recent 
years. This issue was added to the set of new trade issues at the Singapore Ministerial of 
the WTO (1996), and decisions on the modalities for negotiations on trade facilitation, 
including customs procedures, must be made at the Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 
Cancun in September 2003. Attempts have also been made to reform customs services 
unilaterally, sometimes with the help of private companies such as Societe Generale de 
Surveillance (SGS).  
Based on the same report as that used for their port efficiency index, Wilson et al. 
(2003) built an index of the customs environment. For ‘hidden import barriers’ created by 
customs, they find that Finland has the best score (1.000) and Paraguay the worst (.368), 
while for customs bribery, Iceland has the best score (1.000) and Bangladesh the worst 
(.343). As in the case of ports, Singapore is among the best in terms of customs efficiency. 
It has interlinked computer systems and simplified document procedures that allow 
customs clearance in record time. Trade facilitation and more efficient customs services 
would be expected to have a negative impact on the DOT, on the border effect and on the 
home bias in consumption.       
  The general reduction in the bulkiness and weight of tradable goods (including 
radios, computers and machinery) resulted in a decrease in distance costs DC, though 
domestic transport costs and aspects of port costs (such as the cost of storage) may also 
have declined. It is likely that DC declined proportionately more than NDC, which would 
have contributed to an increase in the DOT and an increase in the share shipped by air (see 
equation (13)).  
   24
4.3. Communication Costs  
Telephone communication has become much cheaper, especially for international 
calls. And the internet has further reduced communication costs. Taking communications 
costs into account, equation (16) becomes equation (16’): 
j j j j j i j i i i i i COM MU DT CC t COM L L CC DT MU C NDC + + + + + + + + + + + = τ ) ( 
  and equation (17) becomes: 
j ij ij COM D DC τ ) ( + = .                 (17’) 
where  i COM  ( j COM ) is the domestic communication cost in country i (j) per unit 
of product traded, and  ij COM  is the international communication cost per unit of product. 
Communication costs per unit of time have typically fallen proportionately more for 
international than for domestic communications. However, what matters for the impact on 
the DOT is the cost per unit of production.  
More precisely, what matters is the comparison between the reduction in 
/ j ij COM τ DC  and  NDC COM COM j j i / ) ( + τ . And even though the cost per unit of time 
fell more for international communications, the opposite may well be true for the cost per 
unit of product. The reason is that the production process is likely to be intensive in 
domestic communication, especially for products that require coordination across different 
companies or across units within a company.
43 Moreover, domestic transport also uses 
communications as an input, and thus  i DT  also falls with the reduction in communication 
costs. Consequently, whether the reduction in communication costs has a greater 
proportional impact on DC  or on NDC  is ambiguous, and so is its impact on the DOT 
and on the home bias in consumption.     
An additional effect of cheaper telephone communication and the internet is their 
effect on competition. For instance, articles appeared in local newspapers in the 
Washington, D.C. area in the early 2000s about area car dealers complaining that their 
profit margins had fallen dramatically because potential buyers were able to compare 
                                                 
43 Use of the internet is larger domestically than internationally, including for intra-firm communication, to 
pay bills and buy plane tickets, for information on movies, car prices, etc. This is partly explained by the fact 
that speaking the same language lowers the cost of internet communication and existing business and other 
ties raise its value. For instance, though access to e-Bay is international, most transactions are between US 
residents. Thus, the impact of the internet on home bias is ambiguous a priori. See Leamer and Stern 
(forthcoming) for an analysis of the impact of the internet on the location of economic activity.             25
prices on the internet at a negligible cost. The reduction in communication costs reduced 
local monopoly power and the rents associated with it. This should reduce the DOT. 
Another possibility is that the internet might help make customs more efficient. This 
should also reduce the DOT and should reduce the border effect. 
It would be useful to rank the various factors listed so far in terms of the 
importance of their impact on the evolution of the DOT. However, data on the evolution of 
these factors are not available for a large number of countries. The same holds for the 
factors affecting the benefits of the DOT (see below).  
 
5. BENEFIT DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN DOT  
The classification of the determinants of changes in the DOT in terms of costs and 
benefits is somewhat arbitrary since the effect of an increase (decrease) in the relative 
benefit of trading at, say, small distances is equivalent to the effect of an increase 
(decrease) in the relative cost of trading at greater distances. Nevertheless, the factors 
examined in this section differ from those in Section 4 (they do not deal with changes in 
aspects of dwell and distance costs) and it seems useful to maintain this taxonomy. 
We examine here four phenomena, namely, regional integration, the uneven 
economic growth of various countries or regions, counter-season trade, and international 
production fragmentation and the increasing value of time in trade because of the 
increasing importance of the ability to respond to fluctuations in demand and supply. 
 
5.1. Regional Integration  
  By eliminating trade barriers among member countries, regional integration 
agreements (RIAs) or trade blocs tend to increase the private benefit of intra-bloc trade. 
RIAs are regional in the sense that they are typically formed between neighboring 
countries. Examples are NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, the CACM, CARICOM, the 
Andean Pact, UEMOA, CEMAC, SACU, ASEAN, SAARC, SADC and more.
44 Given 
that the DOT for intra-bloc trade is typically smaller than for extra-bloc trade, and that 
                                                 
44 There are some exceptions, such as the FTAs between Chile and Canada, Singapore and the US, Chile and 
the US, Israel and the US, Chile and the EU, Mexico and the EU, and South Africa and the EU, but most are 
too recent to be able to be analyzed, and their weight in the total trade associated with RIAs is small.     26
RIAs tend to raise intra-bloc trade by making it privately more beneficial, RIAs tend to 
reduce the DOT of its member countries.  
Since Viner’s (1950) classic work, the static economic effects of RIAs have been 
examined in terms of the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion. Whether trade 
creation or trade diversion dominates also affects the impact of RIAs on the DOT. Trade 
creation increases trade among members of the RIA (without affecting trade with excluded 
countries) and, given their relative proximity, reduces the DOT. The negative effect of a 
RIA on the DOT is stronger with trade diversion because, in addition to increasing trade 
between proximate member countries, it also reduces trade with more distant countries. 
Thus, for a given increase in trade among member countries, the greater the degree of trade 
diversion, the larger the reduction in the DOT.    
The above deals with the trade policy aspects of RIAs. Some RIAs also involve 
currency unions (including most of the EU, CEMAC, SACU and UEMOA) and other 
aspects of deeper integration. These tend to increase intra-bloc trade by lowering its cost, 
thereby further reducing the DOT.     
We examine empirically the impact of (the trade and other aspects of) RIAs on 
their DOT evolution for eight RIAs. We estimate, for exports, imports, and for total trade 
(exports plus imports) the regression: 
t t RIA t DOT ε γ β α + + + = ) * ( log ,                   (18) 
where RIA is a dummy variable that takes values of zero (one) before (starting when) the 
RIA is formed or revived, and t is a time trend.
45 The estimation is over the period 1962-
2000. Table 4 shows the estimation results.   
  In the case of exports, we see that the effect of the RIAs on the trend of the DOT is 
negative for all RIAs except for CARICOM
46, and is significant at the 1% level, except for 
UEMOA and SADC (without SACU) where the significance level is 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Abstracting from CARICOM, the average effect of the RIAs on the trend of 
the distance of exports is -.23%.  
                                                 
45 The EU is not included because it was formed before the start of our sample period. 
46 The effect of CARICOM was significantly negative with the data without mirror estimates (with a lot of 
missing data). With the new base, there are fewer missing data but in the case of some small countries, the 
mirror estimates are dramatically different from the values reported by these countries. If we eliminate these 
outliers from the regression, the impact of CARICOM is also significantly negative (-0.27%).    27
  In the case of imports, three of the RIAs (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, and the 
Andean Pact) have no significant impact on the trend in the DOT. The effect of the other 
RIAs is negative, significant at the 1% level for NAFTA, CACM, and ASEAN, and at the 
5% and 10% level for UEMOA and SADC, respectively. The average effect of these RIAs 
on the trend of the distance of exports is -.26%.  
  For total trade, all RIAs except for CARICOM (non significant) have a 
significantly negative impact on the trend of the DOT, significant at the 1% level except 
for the UEMOA (5%) and SADC (10%). The average effect of the RIAs on the trend of the 
DOT is -.20%. 
  In the case of the NAFTA countries, we also examined the impact of both 
CUSFTA and NAFTA. In other words, we estimated equation (18) with a second dummy 
variable for CUSFTA (see note c) in Table 3). CUSFTA’s effect on the trend of the DOT is 
significant for imports (at the 5% level, with an effect of -.13%) and total trade (at the 10% 
level, with an effect of -.08%) but not for exports. As for NAFTA, the results are about the 
same as those in the regression without the CUSFTA dummy.  
Table 3 shows the evolution of the share of US imports and exports by ocean, air 
and land. First, we note a decline in the share of ocean trade and an increase in the share of 
trade by air and land. Interestingly, the share of trade by land declines before 1980 and 
increases thereafter, the latter coinciding with the period when CUSFTA and NAFTA were 
signed. Approximately the opposite occurs with ocean trade, with the share of imports 
declining after 1980 while the share of exports declines after 1975.  
Based on the RIAs examined, it would seem that regional integration has a large 
negative impact on the trend of the DOT over time. Following the creation or revival of 
seven out of eight RIAs, there is either a significant slowdown in the overall positive trend 
(NAFTA, UEMOA), a change from a positive to a negative trend (MERCOSUR, ASEAN, 
SADC), or an increase in (the absolute value of) the negative trend (Andean Pact, CACM).  
However, regionalism only provides a partial explanation of the decline in the DOT 
found in a majority of countries. First, as mentioned above, the DOT of the Andean Pact 
and the CACM exhibit a negative trend before the formation of the RIAs. Second, a lot of 
non-RIA countries also exhibit a significant negative trend. For the 54 non-RIA countries 
in the sample (out of 150 countries), 30 (55.6%) have a negative trend and 10 (18.5%)   28
have a positive trend over the entire sample period, i.e. the ratio of countries with negative 
to positive trends is 3. For the 96 RIA countries in the sample, 47 (49.0%) have negative 
trend and 29 (30.2%) positive trend, i.e. the ratio of countries with negative to positive 
trends is 1.6.
47  
Thus, despite the negative impact of RIA formation on the trend of the DOT, the 
ratio of negative to positive trends in 1962-2000 is almost twice as large for non-RIA 
countries than for RIA countries, i.e., the ratio of positive to negative trends of the DOT is 
almost twice as large for RIA countries. That ratio would of course be larger if the impact 
of RIA formation were not included. Comparing annual trends of the DOT for imports, we 
find that the average for RIA countries is 0.398 and the average for non-RIA countries is –
0.058. The same qualitative results hold for total trade.
48     
   If the term “globalization” is defined as an openness to trade with increasingly 
more distant countries, we find that it is the more globalizing countries that tend to form 
RIAs. Thus, on average, it is countries whose trade with proximate countries declines the 
most (relative to trade with more distant countries) that tend to form RIAs. Could the 
reason be that there are some positive externalities associated with increasing trade with 
neighboring countries, such as increased security and other political and institutional 
benefits (Schiff and Winters 2003), and that such externalities provide an incentive for the 
more globalizing countries to use regional agreements to capture them? 
49    
  
5.2. Economic Growth 
Another issue that can affect the DOT over time is economic growth. Countries that 
belong to a region that experiences a high rate of economic growth will find it beneficial to 
trade relatively more with countries of the region. This will tend to lower these countries’ 
DOT. This is the case for the East Asia-Pacific (EAP) region. It grew faster than the world 
                                                 
47 The RIA group is defined as the countries belonging to the Andean Pact, ANZERTA, ASEAN, CACM, 
CARICOM, CEMAC, Chile-Canada, EAC, EU, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, SADC, SACU, UEMOA, and 
Madagascar. See Table A.5 for the list of countries in a RIA per category. 
48 The average trend for exports is not significantly different from zero for either the RIA or the non-RIA 
group of countries. 
49 Note that if it is correct that regional integration depends partly on the evolution of the DOT, i.e., that it 
depends on the relative changes in distance and non-distance costs, then using dummy variables to capture 
the effect of regional agreements on bilateral trade in gravity models may not be appropriate because of 
potential endogeneity problems.   29
in 1962-79, 1980-89 and 1990-2000 (Table 5), and the trend of its DOT is negative in all 
three sub-periods for imports, exports and total trade (Table 2). This is confirmed by 
Frankel and Wei (1996) who, with the help of a gravity model, find that the increase in 
trade within East Asia “… can be entirely explained by the rapid growth of the countries.” 
If the region (say, EAP) is located far from the US and the EU, the main centers of 
economic activity, and grows faster than the US and the EU, the DOT will tend to increase 
for the latter regions. In that case, the net effect on the world’s DOT would be ambiguous.  
NAFTA’s DOT increased in 1962-1989 and fell in 1990-2000 (Table 2, last three 
columns). One reason is the formation of CUSFTA and NAFTA, but another likely 
contributing factor is the high rate of economic growth experienced by the US and the 
NAFTA region in the 1990s. This is shown in Table 5 where NAFTA’s growth rate was 
lower than the world’s average before 1990 and higher in 1990-2000.  
The MERCOSUR region grew slightly faster than the world in 1962-79, much 
slower than the world in 1980-89, and faster than the world in 1990-2000 (Table 5). We do 
find a strong negative correlation between the differential growth rate with the world and 
the trend of MERCOSUR’s DOT (-.05 in the first period, .20 in the second one, and -.76 in 
the third one; see Table 2). 
Asia’s growth rate is higher than the world’s in all three sub-periods (Table 5) and  
the DOT declines in all three sub-periods (Table 2). Of course, the negative correlation 
does not hold for all regions because the differential growth rate between a region and the 
world is only one of the factors affecting the evolution of that region’s DOT. For instance, 
comparing the last three columns of Table 2 with Table 5, we see that the negative 
correlation holds for the non-OECD group in all three sub-periods (faster growth than the 
world and negative DOT trend) but only holds for the OECD in the last sub-period.     
We also tested the effect of economic growth on the DOT in the following manner. 
We constructed an index that indicates for each country whether high growth occurred 
mainly in proximate or in distant countries. For each country i, the index of relative growth 
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where  ij d  is the distance between countries i and j,  1 , − − t j jt y y  is the change in GDP and is 
a proxy for the change in import demand by country j,
50 and N is the number of countries 
in the world. For any country i, REGit increases (falls) as changes in GDP are larger 
(smaller) in distant than in proximate countries. We regress the annual proportional change 
in the DOT of country i (i = 1,…, N) on the annual proportional change in REGit lagged 
one year, on the assumption that trade reacts to changes in demand with a lag.  
One would expect a positive relationship between the proportional change in 
DOT it  and the lagged proportional change in REGit. In other words, REGit increases if the 
absolute change in GDP is relatively greater in distant countries, and this should result in 
an increase in the DOT it . The regressions show a positive effect of the lagged proportional 
change in REGit on the proportional change in DOT it , with an elasticity of 0.1 and 
significant at the 7% level for exports, and an elasticity of .05 and significant at the 8% for 
total trade. The reason for the fact that the elasticity for total trade is half that for exports is 
that the elasticity for imports is very small and not significant.
 51 
Another test was performed where a cross-country regression was estimated of the 
proportional change in the DOT over the entire period (1962-2000) on the proportional 
change in REGit over the entire period. In the case of exports, we find a significantly 
positive effect of REGit on DOT, with an elasticity of 1.9. The effect on imports is not 
significant (see footnote 51). The elasticity is higher here than in the case of lagged annual 
effects above because this test deals with the long-term effect of changes in REGit on DOT.  
 
                                                 
50 In other words, the implicit assumption is that the marginal propensity to import is constant and the same 
for all countries. Note that all countries in the sample are included, whether country i trades with them or not.  
51 That the level of significance for imports is lower is to be expected. The measure REGit relates directly to 
the demand for a country’s exports. The distance of a country i’s imports might increase with relatively high 
growth in distant countries if this growth is due to technological progress that results in lower costs for 
tradable goods. However, the high growth in distant countries may be due to other factors, namely to greater 
efficiency in the non-tradable goods sector, to discovery of new natural resources or to improvements in 
terms of trade, and these need not raise country i’s imports.   31
5.2.1 Estimation of Determinants of the evolution of the DOT 
Lack of data makes it difficult to test the impact of all the factors presented in 
Sections 4 and 5. We use available data to estimate the annual changes in the DOT as a 
function of two types of trade costs (one related to dwell costs and the other to distance 
costs, see Section 4) and of two “benefit” determinants (Section 5). On the cost side, the 
annual change in the price of oil is used as a proxy of the evolution of distance costs.
52 We 
compute an index of infrastructure that includes the density of roads, paved roads, 
railways, and telephone lines (see Limao and Venable 2001; Brun et al. 2002)
53. This index 
(in annual percentage change) captures both the impact of the evolution of domestic 
transport costs and of the evolution of dwell costs. The correlation between this 
infrastructure index and a port efficiency index, for a sample of 44 countries (include 18 
OECD countries) for which data on port efficiency in 1998 are available, is 0.70.
54 
Similarly, the correlation between this infrastructure index and a custom clearance index is 
–0.59.
55 On the “benefit” side, we consider the impact of regional integration (dummy 
equal to one when the country joins a RIA). We separate the impact of the EU from the 
others RIAs because the EU has reached a degree of integration that is much higher than 
that of the other RIAs. Finally, the annual change of the variable REGit, presented in the 
Section 5.2, is also used as an explanatory variable.  
The estimated equation is: 
 
                                                 
52 We are aware of the fact that technological change can also affect these costs, but lack of data does not 
allow us to test it. 
53 Each country’s infrastructure is measured by an index constructed from four variables from the Canning 
(1996) dataset: km of road, km of paved road, km of rail (each per sq. km of country area), and telephone 
main lines per person. We took the mean over the four variables (each being normalized to have a mean 
equal to one), ignoring missing observations. This is equivalent to assuming that roads, paved roads, railways 
and telephone lines are perfect substitutes as inputs to a transport services production function. Taking the 
mean over the non-missing variables implicitly assumes that the missing observations take on average the 
same value as the non-missing variables (See Limao and Venable 2001, Appendix 1). As the final year of the 
Canning (1996) dataset is 1995, we used the predicted value of the infrastructure index for 1996 to 2000 
according to a quadratic trend estimated by country on the 1962-1995 available data.  
54 The port efficiency index goes from 1 (inefficient port) to 7 (most efficient port) and is based on surveys of 
representative firms in each country. Source: The Global Competitiveness Report, various years (1996-
2000); also available in Appendix B in Clark, Dollar and Micco (2001) for 1998. 
55 The customs clearance index corresponds to the time (median number of days) needed to clear customs, 
based on surveys performed (by the World Bank) with respect to importers in each country. Source: 
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The coefficient 1 β  is expected to be positive because a positive annual change in 
    it REG reflects an absolute income change that is higher in distant relative to proximate 
countries. Hence, this is expected to generate an increase in the distance of trade, 
particularly in exports (see Section 5.2). Note that we use the lagged value of the change 
in     it REG on the assumption that trade reacts with a lag to changes in income of partner 
countries.  2 β and 3 β  are expected to be negative as regional integration agreements (RIAit 
and EUit) tend to promote trade between member countries which are typically proximate 
countries (see Section 5.1).  
A rise in the price of oil (
oil
it P ) results in a increase in transport costs related to 
distance, so that  4 β  is expected to be negative (see Section 4.1). Finally,  5 β  is also 
expected to be negative because an increase in the infrastructure index ( it Infra ) is likely to 
reduce dwell costs (through an increase in port efficiency, a decrease in domestic transport 
costs or both).   
Equation (20) is estimated for the annual change of DOTit of imports, exports and 
total trade by OLS (corrected for heteroskedasticity), with and without country fixed 
effects. Results for two periods, 1964-2000 and 1990-2000, are reported in Table 6. All the 
variables have the expected sign and are significant at least at the 10% level (except in the 
case of the distance of imports in 1964-2000 where only the RIAs are significant, see 
footnote 51). The results of REGit and RIAit support our analysis as well as the tests 
presented in Section 5.1 (Table 4) and Section 5.2 (where we found a significant positive 
effect of the lagged proportional change in REGit on the proportional change in DOTit). 
The explanatory variable of the price of oil
56 and the Infrastructure index are also used in  
                                                 
56 Results are robust if we use the price of oil deflated by the world unit value of imports, exports or by the 
US GDP deflator instead of the spot price index.   33
Brun et al. (2002) who estimate a gravity model in panel in 1962-1996  and successfully 
explain the impact of distance on bilateral trade over time.  
We hope to add other explanatory variables (specific tariffs, customs efficiency, 
containerization and others) as more data become available. However, even though 
equation (20) only includes some of the explanatory variables, so far the results are very 
promising and support the hypotheses developed in this paper.  
 
5.3. Counter-Season Trade 
With the rise in income in the OECD and the reduction in air transport costs, a 
number of countries in the Southern hemisphere have found it beneficial to increase 
exports of perishables such as fruits, vegetables, and fresh fish and seafood products, 
mainly to the OECD. Table 1 shows that the average DOT over the period 1962-2000 is 
less than 5,000 kms for the world and less than 4,500 kms for the OECD, while the 
average DOT for Southern Cone countries is above 8,000 kms, that of SACU is above 
9,000 kms and that of South-East Asia is about 7,000 kms. Given the large distance 
between countries of the Southern and Northern hemisphere, it is likely that this type of 
trade has raised the average DOT for the OECD and for the world as a whole.  
 
5.4. Production Fragmentation and Just-in-Time Inventory Management 
Hummels et al. (1998, p. 79) argue that a “… significant feature of globalization is 
the internationalization of production,” which enables firms to benefit by exploiting “… 
powerful locational advantages, such as proximity to markets and access to relatively 
inexpensive labor.” Feenstra (1998) refers to this phenomenon as the disintegration of 
production. Locating production close to markets is likely to reduce the DOT. On the other 
hand, taking advantage of cheap labor has an ambiguous effect on the DOT. Whether 
geographic fragmentation of the production process raises or lowers the DOT depends on 
whether the distance to the new (host) countries where production takes place is longer or 
shorter than the home country’s DOT before the change took place. For instance, it is 
likely that the EU’s DOT fell as the EU increasingly subcontracted with firms in Central 
and Eastern Europe, and the same is true for the US with the growth of maquiladoras in 
Mexico (even before NAFTA).    34
New information and communications technologies have developed that enable 
manufacturers and retailers to track their inventories much more closely. This has become 
known as “just-in-time inventory management.” Consequently, timely delivery has become 
more important because it is necessary in order to be able to respond quickly to 
fluctuations in demand or supply in the absence of costly inventories. Quick response to 
demand or supply shocks would either require air transport from distant locations—which 
might be prohibitively costly--or delivery from nearby locations. This shift from distant to 
nearby locations is likely to reduce the DOT.
57  
In a recent theoretical and empirical analysis, Evans and Harrigan (2003) show that 
US apparel imports where timely delivery matters have increasingly been imported from 
nearby countries (the Caribbean rather than Asia). These issues were examined in great 
detail in Abernathy et al. (1999). They deal with the apparel and textile industries, and 
argue that it is only since the mid-1980s that this phenomenon of “lean retailing” became 
important.
58 They argue that for apparel manufacturers, the key to success is no longer 
solely price competition but the ability to introduce sophisticated information links, 
forecasting capabilities, and management systems.
59 
Abernathy et al. (1999, p.223) claim that “Because time-to-market and the 
exigencies of short-cycle production are beginning to impact competition in retail-apparel-
textile channels, three global regions are emerging: the United States plus Mexico and the 
Caribbean Basin; Japan plus East and Southeast Asia; and Western Europe plus Eastern 
Europe and North Africa. Each of these regions includes both advanced economies and 
developing areas that are close to consumer markets.”  
In 1991, the main sources of US apparel imports were China, Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and Korea. China’s share of total US apparel imports remained around 15% in 1991-1997, 
while the share of the three others (Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea) fell in the same period 
from 38% to 16%. On the other hand, the share of Mexico grew from less than 4% in 1991 
to 11% in 1997, and the share of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) countries grew to 
                                                 
57 Of course, this issue is relevant for the DOT only because of the international fragmentation of the 
production process.  
58 They claim that the driving force behind lean retailing in the US are chains like Wal-Mart, Kmart and other 
retailers. 
59 This includes, among others, the use of bar codes, electronic data interchange, standard labeling of 
shipping containers, and modular assembly. Firms that adopted these four practices had significantly higher 
profit margins than those that did not.   35
15.8% in 1997. In terms of physical shipments, the share of the four East Asian countries 
in total US apparel imports fell from 63% in 1984 to 23% in 1997, while the share of 
Mexico and CBI countries rose from 7% in 1984 to 39% in 1997. According to Abernathy 
et al. (1999, pp.233-234), these changing shares over time are due in large part to the lean 
retailing phenomenon. Thus, based on the findings by Abernathy et al. (1999) and Evans 
and Harrigan (2003), we conclude that the contribution of lean retailing to the DOT has 
been negative.   
 
6. CONCLUSION  
It has been widely argued that the importance of distance has declined with the 
reduction in transport and communication costs and the integration of the global economy. 
This paper presents findings on the evolution of the distance of trade (DOT) for individual 
countries, regions and for the world. This has not been examined in the literature. We find 
that the DOT falls over time for the average country in the world, and that the number of 
countries with declining DOT is close to double those with increasing DOT. In other 
words, distance has become increasingly important over time for a majority of countries. 
The paper examines a series of hypotheses in order to explain the evolution of the DOT. 
One of the conclusions is that the evolution of the DOT is unrelated to that of the overall 
level of trade costs but depends on the relative evolution of its components. For instance, 
the DOT falls over time as long as dwell costs fall proportionately more or rise 
proportionately less than distance costs, irrespective of the direction of change of transport 
costs as a whole.  
The paper also examines the impact on the DOT of changes in production costs, 
customs costs, domestic transport costs, of air relative to land and ocean transport costs, of 
competition, exchange rate policy, regional integration, uneven growth, counter-season 
trade, and of just-in-time inventory management. We show that changes in production 
costs, domestic transport costs, customs costs and specific tariffs have a similar effect on 
the DOT as changes in dwell costs. One of the more surprising findings is that, despite the 
negative impact of regional integration on the DOT over time, the share of countries with a 
positive trend in the DOT is larger for countries that are members of trade blocs than for   36
countries that are not. The paper also examines the impact of these changes on the home 
bias in consumption and on the border effect.  
We also estimate a regression of the change in the DOT on changes in the relative 
growth index (REG) variable, in the price of oil, infrastructure and regional integration. 
Most of the empirical results support our analysis. 
In future work, we plan to test some of the hypotheses advanced in this paper more 
rigorously as additional data become available, and plan to examine the evolution of the 
DOT at a more disaggregated level. We also plan to examine the evolution of the DOT 
based on weight and volume rather than on value.   37
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Table 1: Average Level and Change in the Distance of Trade of Exports   
X
i d and Imports  
M
i d , 1962-2000 
 




















Categories      
1. World  4789.6 4937.6 -2.5  2.9  0      
average country
 c) 5466.6  5653.2 -5.3  -12.0  -      
World w/o USA  4464.8 4521.4  -2.4  -7.0  -      
World w/o EU-15  6445.0 6637.3  -5.2  0.2  -   0  No  Change 
OECD countries  4300.0 4472.7 -7.0  8.7  ><    
non-OECD countries  6825.0 6253.5 -7.4  -14.0  -    
   
X
i d ∆ < 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < 5.5% 
2.1 EU- 15 members  2699.8 2962.5 -12.3  -13.1  -      
France  2548.6 2726.7  8.1  -5.9  ><    -   Negative Change 
Italy  2957.0 3082.3  1.7  -31.0  -    
Spain  3147.0 3666.2  -32.2  -21.1  -         
X
i d ∆ < -5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < -5.5% 
United Kingdom  3987.9 3976.6  -41.9  -36.7  -   
3. Americas   6008.5 6311.8 -5.5  26.7  +   
or     
X
i d ∆ < -5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < 5.5% 
Americas w/o USA  4948.0 4906.6 -27.4  -0.3  -  
Americas w/o CAN and USA  7188.7 6631.5 -23.2  -10.1  -  
or     
X
i d ∆ < 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < -5.5% 
South America  8582.1 7778.3 -5.1  2.0  0      
NAFTA  5664.6 6108.5 -3.5  38.4  +   +  Positive  Change 
Canada  2809.6 2796.8  -41.8  35.9  ><    
Mexico  4410.4 5102.4  -33.3  -8.0  -         
X
i d ∆ > 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ > 5.5% 
USA  6697.1 7158.5  7.8  30.0  +   
MERCOSUR  8679.5 8568.4 -8.4  -2.5  -  
or     
X
i d ∆ > 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < 5.5%  
Argentina  9127.9 9213.7  -17.8  -9.3  -   
Brazil  8476.3 8304.5  5.2  7.3  +   
or     
X
i d ∆ < 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ > 5.5% 
Uruguay  8409.9 7244.8  -38.0  -22.2  -      
 CARICOM  4511.5 5182.3 -1.3  3.0  0   ><  Opposite  Changes 
 ANDEAN Pact  6930.2 6469.1 -18.3  -8.4  -    
Colombia  6071.1 6401.6  -16.2  -1.8  -     
   
X
i d ∆ < -5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ > 5.5% 
 CACM  5029.1 4838.9 -24.2  -11.6  -  
 4. Asia  8243.1 7924.5 -24.2  -33.9  -   
or     
X
i d ∆  > 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < -5.5% 
Australia  10718.1 12993.0  -22.7  -20.2  -    
New Zealand  12602.1 12031.4  -40.0  -23.3  -      
China  5168.9 6330.2  -2.5  -38.4  -      
Hong Kong, China  9036.7 5097.1  -35.6  -42.1  -      
Japan  8416.0 8668.4  -16.9  -24.6  -      
Asia non OECD  7349.6  6706.3 -9.8  -26.0  -    
 ASEAN  7447.0  7421.0 0.6  -11.4  -      
Korea, Rep.  7192.9 6294.5  4.94  3.96  0      
Taiwan  7732.9 6806.7  -1.99  -6.45  -      
Thailand  6645.1 7329.5  39.1  -22.3  ><      
Philippines  8665.6 7967.7  -9.5  -33.3  -    
 India  6861.6 7633.2  -6.2  -25.5  - 
5. Sub-Saharan Africa  7684.0 7893.5 2.9  12.3  + 
 SACU  9751.8 10107.1 -13.9  -0.2  - 
EAC  6815.3 7403.5 -37.6  -12.6  - 






















β α ˆ ˆ e   ˆ + = , Z = X, M; 
Zimbabwe 
d) 6308.4  6867.4  -6.1  -17.9  - 
UEMOA  5096.4 5577.5 13.9  23.2  + 











i d d ; 
Senegal 4775.9  5417.4  44.2  26.4  + 
Cote d'Ivoire  5349.7  5869.5  -2.4  21.3  + 
Cameroon 5314.6  6053.6  -10.7  12.7  >< 
c) unweighted country average; 
Ghana 6759.6  6739.6  -17.1  10.5  >< 
6. MENA  4071.8 5106.5 57.3  20.5  + 
d) average and change calculated 
on 1965-2000.   41
Table 2: Trend (in percentage) in the Distance 
a) of: 

























1. World  -0.07  -0.52 -0.37 0.49 0.08  -0.56 -0.23 0.79  0.01  -0.54 -0.29 0.65
 p-value  0.08  0.00 0.33 0.02  0.12  0.00 0.50 0.00  0.85  0.00 0.41 0.00 
World average country  -0.14  0.06 -0.38 -0.53 -0.34  -0.28 -0.35 -0.42  -0.33  -0.16 -0.36 -0.41
 p-value  0.06  0.79 0.08 0.08  0.00  0.13 0.03 0.00  0.00  0.36 0.05 0.09 
OECD countries (2000)  -0.19  -0.65 -0.77 0.42 0.22  -0.75 0.51 1.30  0.02  -0.70 -0.12 0.91
  p-value  0.00  0.00 0.11 0.09  0.00  0.00 0.21 0.00  0.73  0.00 0.78 0.00 
non-OECD countries (2000)  -0.20  0.16 0.12 -0.86 -0.40  -0.44 -0.63 -0.74  -0.30  -0.21 -0.16 -0.75
 p-value   0.00  0.01 0.63 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.07 0.00 
2.  Europe  -0.32  -1.43 -0.52 1.45 -0.32  -1.69 -0.48 1.60  -0.33  -1.58 -0.49 1.52
EU- 15 members  -0.35  -1.51 -0.61 1.59 -0.37  -1.83 -0.55 1.74  -0.36  -1.70 -0.56 1.66
 EU- 12 members  -0.41  -1.63 -0.65 1.59  -0.42  -1.95 -0.63 1.93  -0.42  -1.82 -0.62 1.76 
 EU- 9 members  -0.37  -1.68 -0.55 1.69  -0.40  -2.18 -0.53 2.18  -0.39  -1.96 -0.53 1.93 
 EU- 6 members  0.09  -0.85 -0.30 1.86  -0.10  -1.43 -0.46 2.16  -0.01  -1.19 -0.38 1.99 
3. Americas   -0.15  0.07 -0.90 -1.67 0.62  0.60 0.95 -0.46  0.28  0.32 0.19 -0.88
Americas w/o CAN and USA  -0.69  -0.12 0.14 -3.65  -0.28  0.17 -0.20 -0.44  -0.46  0.02 0.17 -1.91 
NAFTA   -0.09  0.18 -1.25 -1.60 0.86  0.84 1.28 -0.57  0.44  0.49 0.30 -0.90
Canada  -1.42  -0.90 -2.83 -3.90  0.83  0.53 2.56 -0.69  -0.30  -0.32 -0.17 -2.05 
Mexico  -1.06  -0.31 -2.58 -1.48  -0.22  0.34 -0.26 -0.47  -0.58  0.12 -1.23 -1.18 
United States  0.20  0.31 -0.59 -0.69  0.69  0.77 0.67 -0.55  0.49  0.53 0.30 -0.52 
MERCOSUR   -0.23  -0.24 0.66 -1.69 -0.07  0.18 -0.61 0.31  -0.14  -0.05 0.20 -0.76
Argentina  -0.52  -0.69 0.56 -1.96  -0.26  0.11 -1.19 -0.06  -0.37  -0.34 -0.32 -0.98 
Brazil  0.13  0.57 0.74 -1.56  0.18  0.90 0.04 0.65  0.17  0.72 0.56 -0.64 
CARICOM  -0.03  -0.40 0.78 -0.98  0.08  -0.13 -0.82 0.42  0.06  -0.21 -0.45 0.18
ANDEAN Pact  -0.53  -0.20 -0.10 -1.84 -0.23  0.04 0.04 -0.19  -0.34  -0.08 0.14 -0.82
CACM  -0.73  -0.67 0.73 -1.01 -0.32  -0.01 2.09 -2.28  -0.52  -0.34 1.47 -1.80
4. Asia  -0.73  -0.65 -0.54 -0.91 -1.09  -1.01 -1.49 -0.65  -0.90  -0.82 -0.95 -1.24
East Asia and Pacific (EAP)  -0.81  -0.78 -0.61 -0.72 -1.15  -1.17 -1.56 -1.25  -0.97  -0.96 -1.02 -0.95
Australia  -0.68  -1.17 0.03 -0.51  -0.59  -1.03 -0.29 -0.36  -0.56  -1.10 -0.08 -0.34 
China  -0.08  -0.25 -2.87 4.21  -1.28  -1.52 -2.59 -0.44  -0.65  -0.84 -2.48 2.04 
Japan  -0.49  -0.21 -0.45 -0.64  -0.74  -0.62 -1.26 -1.46  -0.61  -0.43 -0.72 -0.95 
 ASEAN  0.02  -0.13 0.92 -0.72  -0.32  0.04 -0.83 -0.95  -0.17  -0.03 -0.03 -0.74 
South Asia    0.10  -1.26 1.67 1.26 -0.82  -0.77 -0.62 -0.83  -0.39  -1.03 0.25 0.38
India  -0.26  -1.41 1.22 0.82  -0.77  -0.71 -0.80 -1.01  -0.52  -1.16 -0.01 -0.01 
5. Sub-Saharan Africa  0.08  0.43 -0.29 -0.24 0.17  -0.06 0.47 -0.11  0.15  0.16 0.20 -0.16
East and Southern Africa (ESA)   -0.06  0.47 -0.44 -0.48 -0.01  0.27 -0.28 -0.10  -0.03  0.38 -0.30 -0.26
 SACU  -0.39  0.15 -0.51 -0.70  0.00  0.34 -0.48 0.09  -0.17  0.25 -0.49 -0.24 
 ESA w/o SACU  -0.06  0.42 0.30 -0.73  -0.20  0.38 0.60 -1.89  -0.16  0.39 0.55 -1.42 
West Africa  0.62  -0.10 1.19 -0.53 0.17  0.42 0.78 -0.37  0.53  0.40 0.54 -0.43
 Nigeria  -0.14  0.20 1.25 -0.37  0.10  -0.08 -0.52 0.75  0.31  0.50 -0.59 0.83 
UEMOA  0.34  0.09 1.29 -1.29  0.55  1.03 0.46 0.30  0.47  0.60 0.77 -0.33 
CEMAC  0.35  -0.01 -0.24 2.47  0.30  0.47 -0.40 0.00  0.33  0.29 -0.46 1.04 
6. Middle East and North Africa   1.19  0.95 3.41 1.43 0.49  1.03 -0.61 0.50  0.63  1.30 -0.34 0.62
Middle East   1.03  0.02 0.43 0.96 0.34  0.87 -0.58 0.15  0.44  0.89 -0.23 0.28
North Africa  0.20  0.22 -0.01 1.70 0.36  -0.07 0.33 1.70  0.36  0.34 0.08 1.58
a) 100*β ˆ , with β ˆ by OLS from  it
Z








Table 3: US Trade by Transport Mode (% of value) 
 
  Imports      Exports   
year   Ocean   Air   Land   Ocean   Air   Land 
1965   69.9   6.2   23.9   61.6   8.3   30.1 
1970   62.0   8.6   29.4   57.0   13.8   29.2 
1975   65.5   9.2   25.3   58.9   14.1   27.0 
1980   68.6   11.6   19.8   54.8   20.9   24.3 
1985   60.4   14.9   24.8   43.0   24.5   32.4 
1990   57.2   18.4   24.4   38.4   28.1   33.5 
1994   51.2   21.6   27.3   34.7   29.3   36.0 
 
Sources: Hummels (1999a, Table 3). 
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Table 4: Trend (in percentage) in Regional Integration Agreements. 
 
Trend (%) of DOT over 1962-2000 
Imports Exports  Total 
w/o RIA 
dummy w. RIA dummy b) w/o RIA 
dummy  w. RIA dummy b) w/o RIA 
dummy w. RIA dummy b) 
Trade blocs  Date 
Countries          
(available in the 
sample) 
Overall t t a) RIA*t  Overall  t  t  a) RIA*t  Overall  t t  a) RIA*t 
NAFTA c)   Created in 1994  Canada, Mexico, USA.   0.855*** 1.128*** -0.331*** -0.093 0.101*  -0.236*** 0.437*** 0.665*** -0.277***
MERCOSUR  Created in 1991  Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay.  -0.066 -0.088 0.021  -0.230***  0.036 -0.258*** -0.136*** 0.025 -0.157***
CARICOM   Created in 1974 
Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbaods, 
Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Jamaica, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadine, Trinidad and 
Tobago.  
0.078 0.173 -0.080 -0.034  -0.727** 0.585** 0.063 -0.026 0.074 
CACM   Revived in 1993 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua. 
-0.324*** 0.041 -0.405*** -0.728***  -0.541*** -0.208** -0.519*** -0.234** -0.317***
Andean Pact  Revived in 1991  Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela. -0.230***-0.251*** 0.020 -0.532***  -0.170* -0.352*** -0.340***-0.235*** -0.102***
ASEAN   Revived in 1992 
Brunei, Indonesia, Lao 
PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Vietnam. 
-0.319*** -0.049 -0.279*** 0.016  0.201* -0.192*** -0.157** 0.067  -0.231***
SADC       
(w/o SACU) 





-0.293** -0.050 -0.192* 0.223***  0.362* -0.110* -0.085  0.151  -0.186* 
UEMOA  Revived in 1994 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal, Togo. 
0.548** 0.608*** -0.103** 0.342*** 0.543*** -0.245** 0.465*** 0.579*** -0.158**
***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
        
w/o (w.): estimations without (with) RIA dummy 
a) t: trend over the whole period 1962-2000;           
b) RIA: dummy equal to 1 since the agreement is created (revived), otherwise 0;           
c) if we control for CUSFTA, created in 1989 between Canada and USA, we obtain:    t  + CUSFTA*t   +  NAFTA*t     
         imports  1.222*** -0.126**  -0.272***     
         exports  0.104  -0.004  -0.235***       
         total  0.725***  -0.081*  -0.240***       








Table 5: Evolution of the GDP per Region. 
 
GDP                       
% of the World GDP 
annual GDP growth rate     
% of the World GDP  Country/Region 
1962  1980 1990 2000  1962-1979 1980-1989  1990-2000
World  100  100 100 100  5.45  3.18  2.69 
OECD countries  86.94  84.12 82.85 79.06  5.26  3.02  2.21 
 non OECD countries  13.06  15.88 17.15 20.94  6.60  3.98  4.76 
 EU- 15 members  32.11  34.46 31.84 28.91  5.87  2.36  1.70 
USA  36.28  26.00 25.99 27.47  3.52  3.17  3.26 
Americas  42.89 35.01 0.00 35.52  4.27  2.78  3.24 
NAFTA  37.23  29.42 29.17 30.77  4.08  3.09  3.24 
Latin America and Caribbean  6.60  6.80 5.56 5.89  5.62  1.13  3.28 
MERCOSUR  3.90  4.13 3.24 3.39  5.78  0.73  3.14 
 CARICOM  0.10  0.08 0.07 0.07  4.33  1.97  2.05 
Asia  19.28  24.56 28.58 29.76  6.88  4.75  3.10 
EAP  17.88  23.41 27.12 27.89  7.04  4.71  2.98 
South Asia  1.40  1.15 1.47 1.86  4.29  5.71  5.19 
China  0.61  0.89 1.58 3.18  7.70  9.29  10.10 
Japan  13.66  18.00 19.67 17.36  7.08  4.09  1.41 
 ASEAN  0.93  1.35 1.78 2.22  7.62  6.10  4.99 
Sub-Saharan Africa  1.37  1.23 1.11 1.04  4.82  2.14  2.05 
MENA  1.16  2.08 1.84 1.94  8.90  1.95  3.20 
 




Table 6: Annual Percentage Change in DOTit 
 
1964-2000                   
  in Exports  in Imports  in Total Trade 
Expected 
Sign 
 OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE   
Annual % change in REG (t-1)  0.062*  0.060*  -0.040  -0.015  0.041*  0.038*  + 
RIA  -1.023** -0.824*  -0.416*  -0.492* -0.618**  -0.687**  - 
EU  -1.859** -1.024* -0.820**  -0.792** -1.500**  -0.869**  - 
Annual % change in Oil price -0.032**  -0.037*  -0.004  -0.005*  -0.028*  -0.029*  - 
Annual % change in Infrastructure index -0.029**  -0.028*  -0.007  -0.001 -0.012**  -0.021*  - 
Obs. 4184 4184 4185 4185 4184  4184   
R
2-adj 0.39 0.32 0.11 0.15 0.33  0.35   
              
1990-2000                   
  in Exports  in Imports  in Total Trade 
Expected 
Sign 
 OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS  FE   
Annual % change in REG (t-1)  0.053**  0.038*  0.012  0.009  0.027*  0.015*  + 
RIA  -1.553** -1.462**  -0.816*  -0.498* -1.008**  -0.567*  - 
EU  -0.297* -0.341* -0.486* -0.521*  -0.372**  -0.417* - 
Annual % change in Oil price -0.024*  -0.026*  -0.021**  -0.020*  -0.020*  -0.019*  - 
Annual % change in Infrastructure index -0.029**  -0.033**  -0.027**  -0.032** -0.029**  -0.031**  - 
Obs. 1285 1285 1285 1285 1285  1285   
R
2-adj 0.42  0.35  0.38  0.40  0.39  0.40  
 























Appendix 1. Data, Sample and Computations 
 
This study is based on non-fuel trade data reported from 1962 to 2000 by 150 countries
60 to 
the database COMTRADE of the United Nations Statistical Division. The list of the available 
countries are reported in Table A.1. These reporting countries account together for more than 90% 
of world trade. The distance of trade (DOT) is computed per country and per year with these trade 
data and the spherical distance between the main economic cities of any pair of countries. The 
source for the location of capitals is the CIA World Factbook. The calculations of the spherical 
distances are our own. 
We report the number of data per country in Table A.1 and per year in Table A.2 for the 
distance of imports (“Imports w/o”) and of exports (“Exports w/o). These tables reveal some 
variation in the list of available countries per years, but this is essentially due to small countries (in 
terms of share in the world trade).
61 Hence, this variation in the number of countries does not 
reflect a corresponding variation in the trade weights and then does not influence the evolution of 
the world average distance. However this variation may affect significantly i) the trend of the DOT 
of some sub-region such as Sub-Saharan Africa; and ii) the trend of the DOT of the average 
country in the world, as in this case all the countries have the same weight. 
To overcome this problem, when a country's import data is not available, mirror estimates, 
i.e. export data reported by the partner countries, are used (and vice versa). This approach has the 
advantage of covering almost all the missing data
62. Once the DOT per country and year is 
computed using the database with mirror estimates, we have 5,777 observations,
63rather than 4,641 
for imports and 4,670 for exports in the data base without mirror estimates  (see Table A.1 and 
A.2).  
 
                                                 
60 Actually the sample covers more than 150 countries as data concerning Belgium -Luxembourg and SACU (Southern 
African Customs Union) is not presented for each individual country. 
61 An exception is China, which reports data only since 1984. 
62 Mirror statistics also have some shortcomings, especially for trade between developing countries. 
63 Potential number=150*39=5850.  
  57
Table A.1: Countries in the sample and available DOT data in 1962-2000 
  [w/o (w.): number of observations in the sample without (with) mirror estimates] 
 
Imports Exports  Imports Exports 
Region/Country 
w/o w. w/o w. 
Region/Country 
w/o w. w/o w. 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  995 1463  1004  1462 Asia  974 1216 995 1221 
East and Southern Africa  497  724  504  723  East Asia and Pacific  813  1031  831 1036 
Angola  16 39 22 39  Australia 38 39 38 39 
Burundi  23 39 23 39  Brunei 35 39 35 39 
Comoros  19 39 19 39  China 15 39 15 39 
Kenya  34 39 38 39  Fiji 33 39 34 39 
Madagascar  35 39 35 39  Hong  Kong 39 39 39 39 
Mozambique  24 39 25 39  Indonesia 37 39 39 39 
Mauritius  39 39 39 39  Japan 39 39 39 39 
Malawi  31 36 28 36  Kiribati 30 32 29 32 
Reunion  34 34 34 34  South  Korea 39 39 39 39 
Rwanda  20 39 20 39  Lao  PDR 15 39 15 39 
Sudan  31 39 30 39  Macao 32 39 33 39 
Somalia  22 39 22 39  Myanmar 23 39 22 39 
Seychelles  28 39 28 38  Malaysia 37 37 37 37 
Tanzania  23 36 23 36  New  Caledonia 23 39 28 39 
Uganda  26 39 27 39  New  Zealand 37 39 37 39 
South  Africa  31 39 30 39  Philippines 39 39 39 39 
Zaire  23 39 21 39  Papua  New  Guinea 28 39 32 39 
Zambia  20 36 21 36  French  Polynesia 26 39 26 39 
Zimbabwe  18 36 19 36  Singapore 39 39 39 39 
West  Africa  498 739 500 739  Solomon  Islands 21 34 22 35 
Benin  24 39 26 39  Thailand 39 39 39 39 
Burkina  Faso  24 39 24 39  Tonga 27 33 28 37 
Central  African  Rep.  27 39 27 39  Taiwan 39 39 39 39 
Cote  d'Ivoire  29 39 29 39  Vietnam 16 37 16 37 
Cameroon  31 39 31 39  Vanuatu 23 39 28 39 
Congo  28 39 28 39  Samoa 23 39 23 39 
Cape  Verde  19 37 20 37  Afghanistan 21 39 21 39 
Gabon  24 39 25 39  South Asia  161  185  164 185 
Ghana  29 39 29 39  Bangladesh 24 29 25 29 
Gambia  25 39 25 39  India 37 39 38 39 
Liberia  23 39 23 39  Sri  Lanka 34 39 34 39 
Mali  27 39 26 39  Nepal 27 39 28 39 
Mauritania  21 39 21 39  Pakistan 39 39 39 39 
Niger  26 39 26 39  Europe 847  883  849 889 
Nigeria  32 39 32 39  Austria 38 39 38 39 
Senegal  35 39 35 39  Belgique-Lux 37 37 37 37 
Sierra  Leone  20 39 21 39  Switzerland 39 39 39 39 
Chad  20 39 19 39  Cyprus 39 39 39 39 
Togo  34 39 33 39  Germany 39 39 39 39 
Americas  1209 1435 1234 1425 Denmark 39 39 39 39 
Netherlands  Antilles  32 39 32 39  Spain 39 39 39 39 
Argentina  39 39 39 39  Finland 38 39 38 39 
Antigua  and  Barbuda  15 39 14 37  France 39 39 39 39 
Bahamas  23 39 29 39  Faeroe  Islands 25 32 26 37 
Belize  32 39 32 39  United  Kingdom 39 39 39 39 
Bermuda  23 39 24 39  Greece 39 39 39 39 
Bolivia  38 39 39 39  Greenland 27 34 28 35 
Brazil  39 39 39 39  Hungary 37 39 37 39  
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Imports Exports  Imports Exports 
Region/Country 
w/o w. w/o w. 
Region/Country 
w/o w. w/o w. 
Barbados  39 39 39 39  Ireland 39 39 39 39 
Canada  39 39 39 39  Iceland 39 39 39 39 
Chile  39 39 39 39  Italy 39 39 39 39 
Colombia  39 39 39 39  Netherlands 39 39 39 39 
Costa  Rica  39 39 39 39  Norway 39 39 39 39 
Cuba  17 39 22 39  Poland 21 39 21 39 
Dominica  28 38 26 38  Portugal 39 39 39 39 
Dominican  Republic  23 39 32 39  Sweden 39 39 39 39 
Ecuador  39 39 39 39  Turkey 39 39 39 39 
Grenada  26  37  25  36            
Guatemala  39 39 39 39 
Middle East and North 
Africa  616 780 588 780 
Guyana  22 39 22 39  Midle East  378  507  356 507 
Honduras  39 39 39 39  United  Arab  Emirates 23 39 19 39 
Haiti  17 39 27 39  Bahrain 29 39 29 39 
Jamaica  39 39 39 39  Iran 24 39 25 39 
St.  Lucia  31 37 31 36  Iraq 22 39 21 39 
Mexico  39 39 39 39  Israel 39 39 39 39 
Montserrat  15 37 12 33  Jordan 38 39 38 39 
Nicaragua  38 39 38 39  Kuwait 37 39 37 39 
Panama  39 39 39 39  Lebanon 19 39 18 39 
Peru  39 39 39 39  Oman 31 39 29 39 
Paraguay  39 39 39 39  Qatar 25 39 18 39 
El  Salvador  39 39 39 39  Saudi  Arabia 38 39 31 39 
Suriname  32 39 31 39  Syria 35 39 35 39 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  36 39 36 39  Yemen 18 39 17 39 
Uruguay  39 39 39 39  North Africa  238  273  232 273 
United  States  39 39 39 39  Djibouti 17 39 12 39 
St. Vincent and the Gre.  20  38  21  36  Algeria 37  39  38  39 
Venezuela,  RB  39 39 39 39  Egypt 38 39 38 39 
       Libya 31  39  29  39 
       Morocco 39  39  39  39 
       Malta 37  39  37  39 
              Tunisia 39  39  39  39 
             
              World  4641 5777 4670 5777 
                  +24.5%     +23.7%
 
Table A.2 Number of countries with available DOT data per year. 
  [w/o (w.): number of observations in the sample without (with) mirror estimates] 
 
   1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Imports  w/o  102 106 114 119 117 121 127 130 140 139 142 141 142 139 134 132 124 145 146
Imports w.  134 136 139 143 144 146 148 147 149 149 150 150 149 150 150 150 150 150 150
Exports  w/o  110 113 118 122 117 124 137 134 139 139 136 137 142 141 135 129 127 146 143
Exports w.  136 134 136 145 147 145 148 147 149 149 150 150 149 150 150 150 150 150 150
 
   1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Imports  w/o  148 147 148 106 105 102 99 99 100 103 102 99 100 101 113 109 108 104 99 89
Imports w.  150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 149 149 149 148 148
Exports  w/o  146 146 143 102  98 100 99 99 100 105 106 102 106 106 113 109 108 103 99 91
Exports w.  150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 149 149 149 148 148 
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Table A.3: Trend (in percentage) in the Distance
 a) of: 
 
Exports Imports  Total  Trade  Country/Region 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value Coeff  p-value 
1. World  -0.07  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.01  0.85 
World w/o USA -0.07  0.16  -0.19  0.00  -0.13  0.02 
World w/o EU-15 -0.14  0.01  0.01  0.84  -0.06  0.09 
1.1 OECD countries (2000)  -0.19  0.00  0.22  0.00  0.02  0.73 
1.2 non-OECD countries (2000)  -0.20  0.00  -0.40  0.00  -0.30  0.00 
2.  Europe  -0.32  0.00  -0.32  0.02  -0.33  0.01 
2.1 EU- 15 members  -0.35  0.00  -0.37  0.01  -0.36  0.01 
 - EU- 12 members  -0.41  0.00  -0.42  0.01  -0.42  0.00 
 - EU- 9 members  -0.37  0.00  -0.40  0.03  -0.39  0.01 
 - EU- 6 members  0.09  0.35  -0.10  0.50  -0.01  0.91 
France 0.20  0.00  -0.16  0.30  0.02  0.88 
Germany -0.06  0.52  -0.08  0.41  -0.07  0.40 
Italy 0.04  0.66  -0.98  0.00  -0.46  0.00 
Spain -1.02  0.00  -0.62  0.00  -0.82  0.00 
United Kingdom -1.43  0.00  -1.20  0.00  -1.30  0.00 
2.2 Others c)  -0.03  0.51  0.23  0.00  0.12  0.01 
3. Americas   -0.15  0.05  0.62  0.00  0.28  0.00 
Americas w/o CAN and USA -0.69  0.00  -0.28  0.00  -0.46  0.00 
3. 1 NAFTA   -0.09  0.23  0.86  0.00  0.44  0.00 
Canada -1.42  0.00  0.83  0.00  -0.30  0.00 
Mexico -1.06  0.00  -0.22  0.00  -0.58  0.00 
United States 0.20  0.00  0.69  0.00  0.49  0.00 
3.2 MERCOSUR   -0.23  0.00  -0.07  0.15  -0.14  0.00 
Argentina -0.52  0.00  -0.26  0.00  -0.37  0.00 
Brazil 0.13  0.10  0.18  0.00  0.17  0.01 
Paraguay -0.75  0.00  0.17  0.28  0.01  0.88 
Uruguay -1.26  0.00  -0.66  0.00  -0.97  0.00 
3.3 CARICOM  -0.03  0.64   0.08  0.64  0.06  0.54 
3.4 ANDEAN Pact  -0.53  0.00  -0.23  0.00  -0.34  0.00 
Bolivia -1.26  0.00  -0.56  0.00  -0.84  0.00 
Colombia -0.47  0.01  -0.05  0.31  -0.18  0.03 
Ecuador -0.29  0.02  -0.46  0.00  -0.36  0.00 
Peru 0.19  0.03  -0.28  0.00  -0.07  0.08 
Venezuela, RB -0.08  0.78  -0.26  0.00  -0.32  0.00 
3.4 CACM  -0.73  0.00  -0.32  0.00  -0.52  0.00 
4. Asia  -0.73  0.00  -1.09  0.00  -0.90  0.00 
Asia w/o China -0.71  0.00  -1.03  0.00  -0.85  0.00 
4.1 East Asia and Pacific (EAP)  -0.81  0.00  -1.15  0.00  -0.97  0.00 
 - EAP w/o China  -0.80  0.00  -1.09  0.00  -0.93  0.00 
Australia -0.68  0.00  -0.59  0.00  -0.56  0.00 
China -0.08  0.60  -1.28  0.00  -0.65  0.00 
Hong Kong, China -1.16  0.00  -1.44  0.00  -1.79  0.00 
Japan -0.49  0.00  -0.74  0.00  -0.61  0.00 
Korea, Rep. 0.13  0.52  0.10  0.50  0.10  0.25  
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Exports Imports  Total  Trade  Country/Region 
Coeff  p-value  Coeff  p-value Coeff  p-value 
New Zealand -1.35  0.00  -0.70  0.00  -1.04  0.00 
Taiwan -0.05  0.84  -0.18  0.10  -0.13  0.38 
 - Others EAP  -0.09  0.23  -0.39  0.00  -0.24  0.00 
 ASEAN 0.02  0.84  -0.32  0.00  -0.17  0.01 
Othersb) -0.76  0.00  -1.21  0.00  -0.96  0.00 
4.2 South Asia    0.10  0.93  -0.82  0.00  -0.39  0.00 
 - India  -0.26  0.20  -0.77  0.00  -0.52  0.00 
 - Others  0.55  0.00  -0.84  0.00  -0.18  0.02 
Afghanistan 0.01  0.99  -0.71  0.00  -0.40  0.05 
Bangladesh 0.61  0.04  -1.94  0.00  -0.58  0.01 
Nepal 2.43  0.00  0.47  0.00  1.17  0.07 
Pakistan 0.18  0.20  -0.80  0.00  -0.43  0.00 
Sri Lanka 0.86  0.00  -0.32  0.00  0.28  0.00 
5. Sub-Saharan Africa  0.08  0.14  0.17  0.00  0.15  0.00 
5.1 East and Southern Africa (ESA)   -0.06  0.43  -0.01  0.80  -0.03  0.60 
 - SACU  -0.39  0.00  0.00  0.88  -0.17  0.00 
 - ESA w/o SACU   -0.06  0.33  -0.20  0.03  -0.16  0.04 
SADC (w/o SACU)  0.22  0.00  -0.29  0.01  -0.09  0.33 
EAC -1.24  0.00  -0.35  0.00  -0.67  0.24 
5.2 West Africa  0.62  0.00  0.17  0.00  0.53  0.00 
 - Nigeria  -0.14  0.05  0.10  0.09  0.31  0.00 
 - West Africa w/o Nigeria  0.19  0.00  0.88  0.00  0.28  0.00 
UEMOA  0.34  0.00  0.55  0.00  0.47  0.00 
CEMAC 0.35  0.00  0.30  0.00  0.33  0.00 
6. Middle East and North Africa   1.19  0.00  0.49  0.00  0.63  0.10 
6. 1 Middle East   1.03  0.00  0.34  0.00  0.44  0.00 
 - GCC   1.72  0.00  0.28  0.00  0.25  0.00 
 - Israel  1.02  0.00  -0.11  0.14  0.43  0.00 
 - Others d)   0.07  0.57  0.17  0.01  0.15  0.01 
6.2 North Africa  0.20  0.03  0.36  0.00  0.36  0.00 
 - Egypt, Arab Rep.  -0.47  0.00  0.30  0.03  0.31  0.01 
 - Others e)  0.77  0.00  0.32  0.00  0.43  0.00 
a) 100*β ˆ , with β ˆ from  it
Z
it t d µ β α + + =  ) ln(   ,  t=1..39, Z = X, M, T; 
b) Fiji, Kiribati, Macao China, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, French Polynesia, Samoa, Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu; 
c) Cyprus, Faeroe Islands, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey; 
d) Iran Islamic Rep., Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syrian Arab Rep., Yemen Rep.;  




Table A.4: Shares in the World non-fuel trade
 
 
Exports              
% of World
 a)  
Imports             
% of World   Country/Region 
Average 1962 2000 Average 1962 2000
OECD countries  80.29 82.00 69.11 73.36 75.11 67.24
 EU- 15 members  46.91 48.06 36.30 43.29 46.91 32.30
USA  14.75 17.96 14.36 15.39 13.20 21.31
Americas  24.20 29.98 25.45 25.32 26.11 32.45
NAFTA  20.48 24.26 22.60 21.11 19.25 29.19
Latin America and Caribbean  4.64 6.46 6.04 5.50 7.90 6.84
South America  2.92 4.28 2.36 3.01 5.01 2.42
MERCOSUR  1.90 2.46 1.57 1.48 2.44 1.47
 CARICOM  0.15 0.25 0.09 0.32 0.50 0.20
 ANDEAN Pact  0.67 1.29 0.43 1.24 2.12 0.70
 CACM  0.32 0.50 0.23 0.36 0.47 0.32
Asia  21.64 12.83 32.42 18.83 13.41 26.72
China  1.71 0.68 4.99 1.50 0.53 3.68
Japan  9.23 4.39 10.01 5.25 3.87 5.74
 ASEAN  3.72 2.02 7.87 4.12 2.46 6.12
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.03 3.28 0.78 2.71 3.74 1.12
 SACU  0.66 0.95 0.41 0.84 1.08 0.43
UEMOA  0.25 0.36 0.09 0.26 0.39 0.10
MENA  1.26 1.66 1.41 5.24 4.49 3.25
 
a) i.e. World trade compute from the countries available in the sample as reported in Table A.1.  
    However, we more than 90% of the world (non fuel) trade as reported in COMTRADE. 
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Table A.5: Countries per Category (number of countries/ number in RIA)= (150/ 96) 








Switzerland* Austria* Denmark* Australia* New Zealand* 
 Canada*  Finland*  Belgium-lux*  Portugal* 
 France*  Iceland*  Germany*  Spain* 
 Netherlands*  Ireland* Greece*  United  Kingdom* 















   United  States*  Japan   
Central African  Algeria  Antigua and Barbuda* Afghanistan Mauritius* 
Rep.* Belize*  Bahamas*  Angola*  Mexico* 
Nigeria Brunei*  Bahrain*  Argentina*  Mozambique* 
South Korea  Cameroon*  Benin*  Bangladesh  Myanmar* 
 Cote  d'Ivoire*  Brazil*  Barbados*  Netherlands  Antilles
 Cyprus*  Burkina  Faso*  Bermuda  New  Caledonia 
 Faeroe  Islands  Cape  Verde  Bolivia*  Nicaragua* 
 Gambia Chad*  Burundi  Niger* 
 Greenland Chile China  Pakistan 
 Honduras*  Comoros  Colombia*  Panama 
  Israel*  Congo*  Costa Rica*  Papua New Guinea 
 Kiribati  Djibouti  Cuba  Paraguay* 
 Lao  PDR*  Dominica*  Dominican  Rep. Peru* 
 Libya  Gabon*  Ecuador*  Philippines* 
 Macao  Jordan*  Egypt*  Poland* 
  Mali*  Kuwait*  El Salvador*  St Pierre and 
 Sri  Lanka  Lebanon*  Fiji  Miquelon 
  St. Lucia*  Liberia  French Polynesia Samoa 
 Suriname Malta  Ghana  Sierra  Leone 
 Syria  Mauritania  Grenada*  Solomon  Islands 
 Thailand*  Montserrat*  Guatemala*  Somalia 
 Tonga  Morocco*  Guyana  South  Africa* 
 Yemen Nepal  Haiti  Sudan 
 Zaire*  Oman*  Hong  Kong  Taiwan 
 Zimbabwe* Qatar*  Hungary*  Tanzania* 
   Rwanda  India  Trinidad  and Tobago*
   Saudi  Arabia*  Indonesia*  Tunisia* 
   Senegal*  Iran  Turkey* 
   Seychelles*  Iraq  Uganda* 
   Singapore*  Jamaica*  Uruguay* 
    St. Vincent and the  Kenya*  Vanuatu 
   Grenadines*  Madagascar*  Venezuela,  RB* 



















   Unit.  Arab  Emirates* Malaysia*  Zambia* 
* Countries in a regional integration agreement. 
No Change;     
X
i d ∆ < 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < 5.5% 
Opposite Changes; (    
X
i d ∆ < -5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ > 5.5%) or (    
X
i d ∆  > 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < -5.5%) 
Positive Change (    
X
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M
i d ∆ > 5.5%) or (    
X
i d ∆ > 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < 5.5%) or  (    
X
i d ∆ < 5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ > 5.5%) 
Negative Change (    
X
i d ∆ < -5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < -5.5%) or (    
X
i d ∆ < -5.5% and     
M
i d ∆ < 5.5%) or (    
X
i d ∆ < 5.5% and     
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i d ∆ < -5.5%) 
 